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IMPROVING TAX RULES BY MEANS-TESTING:
BRIDGING WEALTH INEQUALITY
AND “ABILITY TO PAY”
JAMES M. PUCKETT*
Abstract
The federal income tax can and should do more to address wealth
disparities and income inequality. The income tax does not directly count
wealth, and the realization rule and basis “step-up” at death exclude
substantial amounts of income for the wealthy. The Constitution limits
Congress’s ability to tax wealth. Despite these serious challenges, this
Article considers how to potentially bridge the gap between wealth and the
income tax. For example, asset-based phase-outs in the income tax should
pass muster without apportionment, although their bite would necessarily
be limited. The Article posits that the public would be more receptive to
phase-outs than more progressive tax brackets. Relevant to complexity, the
existing literature has identified potential mark-to-market solutions to
correct the exclusion of unrealized gains. The design of asset-based phaseouts would be prefigured to some extent by whether these proposals gain
traction. The income tax, to be sure, cannot by itself solve the problem of
wealth inequality. Principles of tax justice, however, arguably require
greater attention to wealth in measuring the taxpayer’s “ability to pay.”
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Introduction
Amid increases in wealth and income concentration in the United States,1
the federal income tax still serves as “a grand delusion” of progressivity. 2
The federal income tax can and should do more to respond to wealth and
1. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 294-96, 347-50
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (2013) (noting “explosion” of
income inequality and increase in wealth inequality since 1980); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel
Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized
Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520 (2016) (noting that income inequality has
“sharply increased in the United States since the late 1970s” and concluding that “US wealth
concentration is currently high by international standards and has considerably increased in
recent decades”); see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012) (identifying causes and social costs of
inequality). Discourse concerning inequality regularly surfaces in the mainstream media, and
both Democrats and Republicans “talk the talk.” See, e.g., Jared Bernstein, Everyone’s
Talking About Inequality. Here’s How to Tell if They’re Lip Syncing or Really Singing,
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/
2015/04/20/everyones-talking-about-inequality-heres-how-to-tell-if-theyre-lip-syncing-orreally-singing/; David Iaconangelo, Income Inequality: The Good, the Bad, and How to
Tackle It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Global-News/2017/0117/Income-inequality-The-good-the-bad-and-how-to-tackle-it (noting
that after the 2012 election “Republicans in the US have begun to speak the language of
inequality”).
2. Cf. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, TAXES, LOOPHOLES AND MORALS 16 (1963) (indicating
that high marginal tax rates are “a grand delusion”).
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income inequality—or, at the very least, more plausibly link the tax burden
with “ability to pay.”3 To be sure, there are many angles from which to
approach this problem. Although perhaps natural, the separation of wealth
from the federal income tax is not inevitable. This Article examines how
the gap between wealth and ability to pay could be bridged.
The results of the 2016 election should not silence this timeless
conversation.4 Indeed, House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed progressivesounding tax cuts for the poor and middle class and called the plan
“simpler, fairer, and flatter.”5 As a candidate, President Trump also called
for flatter tax brackets.6 The election, however, did not clearly evidence an
3. See infra Section II.A. Although it is a malleable concept, “ability to pay” is the
principal tax equity norm. See, e.g., 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 308 (D. Appleton &
Co. 1909) (1848) (“[W]hatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to bear as
nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all.”); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2, at 171 (A. Allardice
1822) (1776) (“The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the
government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities.”); Edwin R. A.
Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N Q. 562, 767-68
(1908) (second edition of the author’s 1894 book) (noting centuries-old roots of ability to
pay norm); Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867, 867-69 (2002) (asserting
that ability to pay is generally accepted and citing domestic and foreign sources).
4. No doubt from very different perspectives and offering radically different proposals,
during their 2016 campaigns, Donald Trump, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and
Senator Bernie Sanders all spoke out about economic inequality. See, e.g., Jon Hartley &
Glen Hubbard, The Economic Ignorance of Trump and Sanders, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 21,
2016), http://www.national review.com/article/432986/free-markets-bernie-sanders-donaldtrump-oppose-them-blindly (“The rise of populist candidates — Trump and Sanders, with
Clinton increasingly tagging on — arguably mirrors the recent trends, in wealth and income
inequality, documented by economists such as Thomas Piketty . . . .”); Felipe Ossa, The
Economist Who Brought You Thomas Piketty Sees ‘Perfect Storm’ of Inequality Ahead, NEW
YORK MAG. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/03/milanovicmillennial-on-millennial-war-is-next.html (noting economist Branko Milanovic’s remarks
that “even the word inequality was not politically acceptable, because it seemed like
something wild or socialist” and asserting that this “began to change a few years ago”).
5. Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, A BETTER WAY (June 24, 2016),
16-17, http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf. As this
Article goes to press, the House of Representatives has passed a tax reform bill entitled the
Tax Cut and Jobs Act. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (as passed by House, Nov. 16, 2017)
[hereinafter TCJA]. A comprehensive analysis of the TCJA and the emerging plan in the
Senate lies beyond the scope of this Article.
6. See TAX POL’Y CTR., WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT DONALD TRUMP’S TAX PLAN (2017),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/141946/what-is-known-aboutdonald-trumps-tax-plan_1.pdf; see also Rupert Neate, Trump’s Tax Plan: Massive Cuts for the
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indifference to economic inequality so much as empower voters dissatisfied
with elites and excited about “change.”7 More generally, tax cuts often
follow years with high tax rates, and tax increases often follow years with
low tax rates.8
Current income tax brackets barely distinguish between the upper-middle
class and the rich.9 Indeed, the tax brackets generally apply a lower tax rate
1% Will Usher ‘Era of Dynastic Wealth’, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/23/trump-tax-plan-cuts-wealthy-low-income-inequality; Lee
Sheppard, Trump’s Tax Plan, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
leesheppard/2016/11/13/trumps-tax-plan/#58bf2e9e1122. On the other hand, then-candidate
Trump proposed repealing the step-up in basis at the death of the taxpayer, albeit coupled with
estate tax repeal. See Allyson Versprille, Trump Plan Repeals Estate Tax, Scraps Capital Gain
Benefit, BLOOMBERG BNA: NEWS (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.bna.com/ trump-plan-repealsn57982077269/.
7. See Nancy Benac & Emily Swanson, Americans Are Angry at the Government, Desire
Change, Exit Polls Show, PBS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ rundown/
americans-angry-government-desire-change-exit-polls-show/ (noting “simmering discontent of
the American electorate” and that four in ten voters were “hungry for change” and
overwhelmingly favored Trump); Stephen Fidler, In the Wake of a Tumultuous Year, the
Global Elite Face a World of Uncertainty, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/in-the-wake-of-a-tumultuous-year-the-global-elite-face-a-world-of-uncertainty1484560809 (noting that unemployment or giving up on seeking employment “combined with
anxieties about immigration and terrorism, have encouraged a backlash against mainstream
politicians and associated elites”); Beverly Gage, How ‘Elites’ Became One of the Nastiest
Epithets in American Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/03/magazine/how-elites-became-one-of-the-nastiest-epithets-in-american-politics.html
(asserting that Trump “turn[ed] the 2016 election into a competition between knowledge
systems: the tell-it-like-it-is ‘people’ versus the know-it-all ‘elites’”); Virginia Postrel, Trump
Is the Change Voters Wanted, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.
com/view/articles/2016-11-09/trump-is-the-change-voters-wanted (“When exit polls asked
what quality in a candidate matters most, a plurality of voters, 39 percent, said ‘can bring
change.’ Trump captured 83 percent of those votes.”).
8. See generally William E. Foster, Partisan Politics and Income Tax Rates, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 703 (examining historical influences on tax brackets); Tracey M. Roberts,
Brackets: A Historical Perspective, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 925 (2014) (surveying tax bracket
changes and related historical events).
9. For an individual, the 33% bracket begins at income of $191,651; the 35% bracket
applies next to a very thin slice of income beginning at $416,701; and the top ordinary
income rate of 39.6% starts at $418,401. Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (setting
forth inflation adjusted tax items for 2017). If enacted, the TCJA would impose a $1 million
bracket threshold for the 39.6% tax rate for married taxpayers filing jointly. TCJA § 1001(a)
(revising I.R.C. § 1). Although it cuts taxes for the wealthy, the bill implicitly acknowledges
that tax rates max out at an inappropriately low level of income under current law. As a
starting point for discussion, upper-middle class might be defined as the top 20% by income,
which translates to earning an income of close to $200,000 a year. See Richard V. Reeves,
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to long-term capital gain income, such gains being predominantly realized
by the wealthiest taxpayers.10 Recent IRS analysis concluded that in 2013,
much like prior years, the average income tax rate declined from
approximately 27% within the top 1% of incomes overall to approximately
24% at the top .001% of incomes.11 The top 400 taxpayers have sometimes
paid an effective rate of less than 20%.12 Differences between the top tiers
are substantial: the top 1% had an average adjusted gross income (AGI) of
$428,713, while the top .001% had an average AGI of over $45 million.13
This regressive pattern serves as a compelling example of a larger
problem: the income tax inadequately links the tax burden to taxpayers’
ability to pay. Stepping back from the tax brackets, gross income comprises
only a technical subset of a taxpayer’s increases in wealth from year to
year. Thus, even if income were a good enough proxy for ability to pay, the
implementation in the Code falls short.14
The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class, BROOKINGS (Sept. 3,
2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2015/09/03-separationupper-middle-class-reeves. As Reeves aptly responds to the admitted complexity of defining
the term:
Class is of course made up of a subtle, shifting blend of economic, social,
education and attitudinal factors. . . . [A]n income-based classification will
provide a good starting point, not least because the trends in income inequality
are fairly clear: the top fifth is pulling away from the rest of society.
Id.
10. Compare I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C)-(D) (2012) (imposing 15% and 20% rates on longterm capital gains) with I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (2012) (imposing up to 39.6% rate on ordinary
income). The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the capital gains preference
costs over $1 trillion in a ten-year period and that the top 1% enjoy 68% of the tax savings
from the preference. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES
IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf.
11. See Adrian Dungan, Individual Income Tax Shares, 2013, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL.,
Summer 2016, at 82, 82, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-ints-id1609.pdf. A further
breakdown of the average tax rates at the top of the income spectrum shows the very highest
tiers paying a lower average rate of tax than the top .1%, which pays the highest tax rate. Id.
at 89 (the top .001% paid an average rate of 24.12%; the top .01%, an average of 26.21%;
the top .1%, an average of 27.91%; the top 1%, an average of 27.08%; the top 2%, an
average of 25.86; and the top 3%, an average of 24.78%).
12. See Roberton Williams, Income and Taxes of the Very Rich, 136 TAX NOTES 121,
121 (2012).
13. Dungan, supra note 11, at 82.
14. See infra Section I.B.1. Exacerbating this phenomenon, courts sometimes agree with
taxpayers claiming exclusions that lack any apparent statutory basis. See Alice G. Abreu &
Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the Definition of
Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101, 103-04 (2012) (positing that “noneconomic values” underlie
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In addition, the Code is largely agnostic about the differences between an
investor whose income consists of $50,000 in taxable interest and a worker
whose annual salary is $50,000. These two taxpayers are not similarly
situated. Historically, property ownership was the most important measure
of taxpaying capacity.15 Substantial wealth provides security, flexibility,
and an opportunity to exercise power. In addition, wealth serves as a proxy
for untaxed income, so long as the realization rule and other deferral
mechanisms apply.
Other federal taxes, in their totality, add up to a system that is much less
progressive than most would imagine.16 Some would argue that the estate
tax and the corporate tax are already adequate to reduce wealth inequality.
As Professor Edward McCaffery crisply puts it, however, “The simple
answer is: No, they are not.”17 Estates now have a multimillion-dollar
federal estate tax exemption. And substantial avoidance or underreporting
of estate tax liability seems likely.18 Estate tax reform, or transformation
a “puzzling gap between what the broad definition that Glenshaw Glass would seem to
include in the tax base and what is actually included”); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K.
Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 345 (2011) (arguing that “income” is
most apt as a standard so, for example, “the IRS can weigh equity and efficiency, both of
which [might] point to income, but allow administrability to outweigh them”).
15. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 66, 94 (1959);
EUGENE STEUERLE, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, EQUITY AND THE TAXATION OF WEALTH
TRANSFERS 5-6 (1980); Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243, 245 (1946)
(citing Cicero and Justinian). That income has become important is no surprise because the
economy has diversified so much beyond products of the land. See STEUERLE, supra, at 6;
see also Buehler, supra, at 245-46 (“General property appears to have been regarded as the
most satisfactory index of personal ability, but its deficiencies were seen and efforts were
exerted to tax wages, salaries, and other receipts from personal services, and to impose
commodity taxes that would reach the rich who escaped from property taxation.”).
16. See infra Section I.B.2.
17. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, 70 TAX L. REV. 305, 326 (2017).
18. See id. (noting that “Sheldon Adelson was able to transfer nearly $8 billion to his
family” tax-free and “hundreds of billions of dollars sit in dynasty trusts . . . forever out of
the estate tax’s reach”); cf. Debrah Rahmin Silberstein, A History of the Death Tax—A
Source of Revenue, or a Vehicle for Wealth Redistribution, 17 PROB. & PROP. 58, 64 (2003)
(“The history of the death tax demonstrates that it has greatest political support when the
purpose is to raise needed revenue. Often that revenue is for a specific purpose, such as
military spending.”). But see Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap:
Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 168 (2009) [hereinafter
Caron & Repetti, Estate Tax Non-Gap] (finding one-third of largest estates transferred
outside family) (“What should one make of the wildly disparate estate tax gap estimates—
76.8%, 22.9%, 13%, and 10%? We believe that the lower estate tax gap estimates may be
justified[.]”); Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces,
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into an accessions tax,19 may be harder to achieve than income tax reform
because the estate tax is so susceptible to public misinformation.20
Meanwhile, the incidence of the corporate tax may fall on labor rather than
shareholders and likely at an effective rate much lower than the statutory
rate.21
A wealth tax may appear to be an obvious solution to the problem of
wealth inequality. Substantial constitutional questions would arise,
however, unless a wealth tax were apportioned among the states based on
their respective populations.22 The burden of an apportioned wealth tax
would be arbitrary.23 And although there is a plausible argument that an
unapportioned wealth tax would pass muster, this Article seeks a
142 TAX NOTES 1231 (2014) [hereinafter Caron & Repetti, 5 Easy Pieces] (recommending
five estate tax reforms to reduce inequality and promote growth).
19. For the distinction between wealth and accessions and the underlying theories for
choosing between the two tax bases, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, Divide and Conquer:
Using an Accessions Tax to Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913, 91820 (2016).
20. See Mayling Birney et al., Public Opinion and the Push to Repeal the Estate Tax, 59
NAT’L TAX J. 439, 442 (2006) (“Surveys also consistently show that the number of people in
favor of repeal [of the estate tax] drops when respondents are given information on
exemption levels or how many people pay.”); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect
and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1051 (2004) (“The estate tax truly is primarily a
tax on the super-rich.”); Misperceptions on Estate Tax Detracting from Worthwhile
Revenues for United States, RUTGERS BUS. SCH. (May 25, 2011), http://www.business.rut
gers.edu/business-insights/misperceptions-estate-tax-detracting-worthwhile-revenues-unitedstates (“There’s a swathe of misinformation that touts the estate tax as applying broadly and
that’s not true. The tax actually impacts only 0.1% of the American public but if you asked
100 people, at least 60 of them would say it applies to them.”) (quoting Professor Jay Soled).
21. See Rosanne Altshuler et al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global
Economy, 30 VA. TAX REV. 355, 371-72 (2010) (suggesting that the corporate tax may only
be “mildly” progressive); Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The
Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627,
1642 (2005) (“Because no one knows the true incidence of the corporate tax, many studies
simply present alternative scenarios, with no weighting as to which is more likely to hold in
reality.”); Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV.
433, 433 (2012) (“[G]enerations of corporate tax incidence models have failed to reach a
clear consensus on this question.”); McCaffery, supra note 17, at 326 (observing that most
economists say the burden falls on labor rather than shareholders); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr.,
President’s Dividends Plan Undertaxes High-Income Taxpayers, 98 TAX NOTES 389, 389
(2003) (arguing that high-bracket taxpayers are undertaxed on dividends because of
corporate tax preferences, deferral of shareholder level tax on retained earnings, and the
availability of step-up in basis at death).
22. See infra Section IV.A.
23. See infra Section IV.A.
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workaround: an income tax which incorporates asset-based phase-outs
should not be a “direct tax.”24
Beyond the more novel possibility of asset-based phase-outs, this Article
explores existing proposals and historical precedents, including prior tax
brackets, capital gains tax rate reform, and repealing the exemption of a
decedent’s unrealized capital gain. It also explains how the phase-out
technique would be entwined to some extent with those other options.
Phase-outs, to be clear, would not amount to a renamed “Buffett Rule.”25
Achieving fairness in the tax system is an important goal on its own, and
fairness also bears on consequences. The government’s ability to collect tax
is at stake; the system remains, for many taxpayers, based on voluntary
compliance.26 The likely social costs of inequality also counsel the pursuit
of distributive changes in the tax system.27 Of course, scholars have long
disputed whether economic inequality is harmful.28 However, this Article
draws from the substantial evidence that economic inequality is costly.29
A natural extension of the distributive question is whether a particular
change of tax law should help balance the budget. Although the issue is
complicated, many would probably say that the need to make progress
toward a balanced budget is obvious and compelling.30 This Article does
24. See infra Section IV.C.
25. The Buffett Rule seeks to apply a minimum tax rate based on the taxpayer’s realized
income. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Beyond the ‘Buffett Rule’: Making the Income Tax
More Progressive, 133 TAX NOTES 705 (2011). Asset-based phase-outs, ideally, would seek
to achieve vertical equity even in a mark-to-market system, but could still potentially operate
even in a realization-based income tax. See infra Section III.C.
26. See J. T. Manhire, Tax Compliance as a Wicked System, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 235, 244
(2016).
27. See infra Section I.A.
28. Cf. HENRY C. SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ-FAIRE: SOME PROPOSALS
FOR A LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICY 12 (Harry D. Gideonese ed., 1934) (remarking that a
“substantial measure of inequality may be unavoidable or essential for motivation; but it
should be recognized as evil and tolerated only so far as the dictates of expediency are
clear”).
29. Cf. PIKETTY, supra note, 1 at 16 (“It is long since past the time when we should have
put the question of inequality back at the center of economic analysis and begun asking
questions first raised in the nineteenth century.”).
30. The Economic and Fiscal Benefits of Pro-Growth Policies: Hearing Before the H.
Budget Comm., 114th Cong. 1-2 (2016) (statement of John W. Diamond, Ph.D., Rice
University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) (“The federal debt is projected to increase as a
share of GDP from 77 percent in 2017 to 150 percent in 2047. As noted above, demographic
changes are driving much of the increase in federal spending with the remaining increase
related to rising interest payments on the national debt. The obvious conclusion is that the
projected expenditure increases in the United States are unsustainable and fiscal restraint is
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not, however, aim to address whether Congress should prioritize balancing
the budget over using revenue from wealthy taxpayers to reduce the tax
burden on others.
Part I provides a brief background on the social harms of economic
inequality and the tax system’s limited progressivity. Part II identifies
several design challenges facing the concept of linking ability to pay tax
with taxpayers’ wealth. Part III considers how best to respond to these
challenges and cautiously advances asset-based phase-outs as a modest
work-around to the constitutional limitations on wealth taxation. Part IV
discusses the constitutional requirement of apportioning “direct taxes” and
the potential escape hatches from apportionment.
I. Economic Inequality and the Tax System
Since the 1980s, economic inequality in the United States has expanded
markedly. Economist Thomas Piketty summarizes the lead up to the current
state of income inequality:
The top decile claimed as much as 45–50 percent of national
income in the 1910s-1920s before dropping to 30–35 percent by
the end of the 1940s. Inequality then stabilized at that level from
1950 to 1970. We subsequently see a rapid rise in inequality in
the 1980s, until by 2000 we have returned to a level on the order
of 45–50 percent of national income.31
Many have argued that economic inequality harms the economy and
undermines the potential for a robust and vibrant democracy.32
Economic inequality has been trending upward as a result of two
overarching mechanisms. First, the government has promoted inequality
through shaping the rules of the market.33 Second, even as the government
imperative. The United States must reduce the projected level of expenditures and reform its
tax system to reduce economic distortions and maximize economic growth.”).
31. PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 23.
32. Christina Pazzanese, The Costs of Inequality: Increasingly, It’s the Rich and the
Rest, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/thecosts-of-inequality-increasingly-its-the-rich-and-the-rest/.
33. See John Schmitt, Inequality as Policy: The United States Since 1979, CTR. FOR
ECON. & POL’Y RES. (Oct. 2009), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/inequality-policy2009-10.pdf (“Taken together, these policies – a low and falling minimum wage; the de- or
re-regulation of major industries; the corporate-directed liberalization of international
capital, product, and labor markets; the privatization of many government services; the
decline in unionization; and other closely related policies – are the proximate cause of the
rise in inequality.”).
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fosters inequality in the pre-tax sense, it does less and less to counteract
inequality through the tax and spending systems.34
A. Harms of Economic Inequality
Elevated levels of economic inequality inhibit economic output and
decrease happiness; the rich insulate themselves from the impact, while the
poor and middle class bear a disproportionate burden.35 There is surely no
set list of dynamics in this process, but several primary phenomena or
patterns can be identified. A recurring theme is that the rich are different
from most people in terms of preferences, influence, resources, and ability
to use self-help to solve problems.36
Political contributions and independent political expenditures are
concentrated in a very thin slice of the population.37 Professor Timothy
Kuhner explains just how elite this group is:
In the case of superPACs and dark money groups, where limits
are weakest, 200 millionaires and billionaires (0.000063 percent
of the population) stand behind roughly 80 percent of all the
money spent. In the end, 0.37 percent of the population supplies
approximately 70 percent of all money in politics.38
Even if spending alone is insufficient to procure a desired outcome, this
elite group has long enjoyed greater access to politicians,39 and legislative
agendas tend to mirror their concerns.40
34. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 77.
35. Id. at 83.
36. Cf. RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS 58 (2017) (detailing the ability of the
upper middle class to maintain their economic position for their children, and thus perpetuate
“a more rigid class structure than many European nations,” through inheritances, legacy
preferences in the elite college admissions process, zoning ordinances, and the procurement
of valuable internship experiences through previously established connections).
37. David Weakliem & Robert Biggert, Not Asking for Much: Public Opinion and
Redistribution from the Rich, 12 COMP. SOC. 66, 67 (2013) (“Money provides political
advantages even when rights to vote are equal, so affluent people may be able to block or
weaken measures that threaten their interests even when those measures are popular with the
public.”).
38. TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY: MONEY IN POLITICS AND THE
FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION 6 (2014) (footnote omitted).
39. See G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? THE TRIUMPH OF THE CORPORATE
RICH 54-55 (7th ed. 2014) (noting the Bohemian Grove as a place for political Lakeside
Talks between the upper class, corporate rich, and political hopefuls) (“The retreat
sometimes provides an occasion for more than fun and merriment. Although business is
rarely discussed, except in an informal way in groups of two or three, the retreat provides
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Economic inequality leads to instability, which in turn depresses output.
Wealth concentration depresses overall demand, leading to unemployment,
which often cascades into government intervention to spur private
investment through cheap credit.41 Demands for deregulation increase
risk.42 The bubbles in technology startups and in housing are painful
reminders of the phenomenon.43 Inordinate risk from bubbles pushes down
investment, dampening growth.44 Economist Joseph Stiglitz identifies a
peculiar “irony” of this historical pattern: “while inequality gives rise to
instability, the instability itself gives rise to more inequality.”45 Then,
because “the rich are better able to bear risk, they reap the reward that
society provides for compensating for the greater risk,” notwithstanding
that they initiated the policies that imposed the risk and its costs on others.46
High inequality produces a myriad of other obstacles to productivity.
The more wealth becomes concentrated, the less the government invests in
infrastructure, research, and education.47 From state to state in the United
members with an opportunity to introduce their friends to politicians and to hear formal
noontime speeches, called Lakeside Talks, from political candidates and a wide range of
experts.”).
40. See KUHNER, supra note 38, at 6; see also DOMHOFF, supra note 39, at 162 (“The
corporate rich and the power elite build on their structural power, their status power, their
storehouse of policy recommendations, and their success in the electoral arena to dominate
the federal government on the issues they care about. Lobbyists from corporations, law
firms, and trade associations, working through the special-interest process, play a crucial
role in shaping government policies on narrow issues of concern to wealthy families,
specific corporations, or business sectors.”).
41. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 84; Michael E. Porter & Jan W. Rivkin, A Wake-up Call for
Tomorrow’s Top 1 Percent: Rebuild America’s Middle Class, FORTUNE (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/03/26/a-wake-up-call-for-tomorrows-top-1-percent-rebuild-americasmiddle-class/ (“Weak middle-class prospects undermine the consumer spending on which
many businesses depend. Workers with marginal or stagnant incomes, and without the skills
needed to improve them, are less committed and less productive. And a languishing middle
class fosters disgruntled voters who demand policies that redistribute prosperity rather than
create it.”).
42. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 89; Katherine Bentley, Senior Thesis, The 2008 Financial
Crisis: How Deregulation Led to the Crisis, LAKE FOREST C. PUBLICATIONS, 27 (2015),
http://publications.lakeforest.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=seniortheses.
43. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 87-89; Bentley, supra note 42, at 4-11 (noting the
significance of the housing bubble as a contributory factor in the 2008 recession).
44. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 91.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 93; JAN W. RIVKIN ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED PROSPERITY 22-23
(Sept. 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/challenge-of-shared-prosper
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States, as well as in other countries, economic inequality is associated with
lower life expectancy, higher crime, increased rates of mental health
conditions, and other social problems.48 This underinvestment occurs
“despite evidence that the boost these investments give to the economy far
exceeds the average return in the private sector, and is certainly higher than
the cost of funds to the government.”49 Decreased educational attainment
inhibits productivity.50 And reduced economic mobility erodes faith in a
core tenet of democracy.51
Piketty identifies the ability of a small, top-earning managerial class to
effectively “set their own remuneration” as a key driver of inequality.52
Their compensation, however, lacks “any clear relation to their individual
productivity.”53 Similar to the case of the elite managerial returns, Piketty
suggests that the return from capital is oftentimes “unpredictable and
arbitrary” and catapulted by the owner’s starting wealth.54
In many industries, only a few top performers take most gains.55 That is
not to say that top earners were simply lucky; however, such winner-takeall markets may yield windfalls to those who could not possibly have
anticipated their return on effort, while making it difficult for others to
enter. If the cost of entry into a venture is considerable, and only a few
investors are likely to profit, some potential inventors and competitors will
not try.
ity_95e150dc-b2fd-417f-8c6d-c33a27fd6cb8.pdf (noting that rising inequality led to
“political polarization and paralysis” and in turn “systemic underinvestment in the
commons”); Pazzanese, supra note 32.
48. See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 19-20 (2009).
49. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 93.
50. Id. at 94; J. Bradford Delong et al., Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth, in AGENDA
FOR THE NATION 17, 30 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2003) (“The slower growth in the
educational attainment of the work force from 1980 to 2000 shaved productivity growth by
0.13 percent a year relative to the average for 1915 to 1980.”).
51. Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, 52 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 48, 48 (2008) (“The analyses demonstrate that economic inequality powerfully
depresses political interest, discussion of politics, and participation in elections among all
but the most affluent and that this negative effect increases with declining relative income.”)
52. PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 24. Piketty finds that similar trends have taken hold
globally, though except in Britain, the trend is “less marked.” Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 26-27.
55. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY
(1995) (arguing that minor differences in performance lead to enormous differences in
return, which is an inefficient barrier to entry).
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Rent-seeking goes hand in hand with inequality. The problem goes
beyond the potential waste of lobbying expenditures. For example, results
of rent-seeking include misallocations of resources involving monopolized
products (such as pharmaceuticals), misallocations of talent into the
financial sector, and inadequate accounting for environmental and other
social costs.56 Inequality fosters rent-seeking because the wealthy can
attempt to capture the benefits of rent-seeking while forcing others to bear
the burdens.57
Finally, subtle effects on productivity and psychological enjoyment may
be related to perceptions of inequality.58 As to productivity, there is
evidence that workers who feel unfairly compensated tend to be less
productive.59 Regarding psychological enjoyment, the perceived need to
compete—as it turns out, futilely—for status goods leaves less time for
family and friends and generally produces unhappiness.60
B. Flattening of the Federal Tax System
As discussed below, while economic inequality has escalated, the federal
income tax and estate tax have been reduced from their historical levels.
The capital gains preference further undermines the progressivity of the
federal tax system. Meanwhile, the payroll tax adds a regressive element to
the federal tax system. Capital gains preferences and payroll taxes are not
new, but at least in the past, highly progressive tax brackets for ordinary
income, as well as a more robust estate tax, did more to achieve
progressivity in the overall tax system.
1. Federal Income Tax
The federal income tax has changed from a class tax, targeting only rich
Americans at its inception,61 to a mass tax,62 drawing in both rich and
56. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 95-98.
57. Id. at 99 (citing permission and subsidy of offshore drilling as an example of “huge”
private rewards with dispersed costs for ordinary Americans).
58. See Elizabeth Tricomi et al., Neural Evidence for Inequality-Averse Social
Preferences, 463 NATURE 1089 (2010) (citing prior behavioral and anthropological evidence
that humans favor reducing inequality and finding “direct neural evidence” of aversion to
inequality using functional MRI testing).
59. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 104.
60. Id. at 104-06.
61. The Civil War income tax initially was a flat 10% and exempted average households
from taxation with a personal exemption. See W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on
U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
TAXING THE RICH 29, 34-35 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000). Later, the exemption was reduced
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average Americans. From 1913 until 1980, however, income tax brackets
penetrated into much higher levels of purchasing power.63 Today, the
brackets level off before $500,000 of income.64 As explained below, the
earlier top brackets were often much higher, especially if converted into
purchasing power in 2017 dollars.65 Platinum brackets recognized that those
with ultra-high incomes are differently situated from the upper middle class
or the merely rich.66 In addition, multimillion-dollar incomes were
separately distinguished via the tax brackets at various times.67
In 1913, although there were no platinum brackets, the top rate of 7%
applied to incomes above $500,000—well over $10 million in present
value.68 Platinum brackets appeared as early as 1917, disappeared after
World War I, then reappeared in the 1930s.69 In the late 1930s and early
1940s, top brackets penetrated to around $80 million in present value.70
Thus, the federal income tax sharply distinguished among different classes
of taxpayers, especially when it transformed into a mass tax during World
War II.71 As late as 1963, a 91% rate of tax applied to incomes over $1.5
million in present value ($200,000 in 1963 dollars).72
and a 5% bracket added. Still, the tax only reached a relatively small proportion of
households. The tax expired in 1872. The 1894 income tax (ultimately struck down) applied
a 2% tax, exempting as before most taxpayers with a personal exemption. Likewise, after
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the 1913 income tax exempted most taxpayers. Id.
at 40-41.
62. See id. at 58; Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in
the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686 (1988).
63. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 936-38; SOI Tax Stats – Historical Table 23, IRS
(Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/ uac/soi-tax-stats-historical-table-23.
64. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (providing
inflation adjusted tax brackets).
65. After 1941, million-dollar brackets superficially disappeared, but nominal top
brackets of $200,000 to $400,000 in the following decades represent well over $1 million
when inflated to present value. See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013
(Nominal and Inflation-Adjusted Brackets), TAX FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://taxfoundation.org/article/us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-brackets [hereinafter U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates
History].
66. This Article refers to income tax brackets with a threshold of at least $1 million as
“platinum” brackets.
67. See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 65.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Brownlee, supra note 61, at 59.
72. See U.S. Federal Income Tax Rates History, supra note 65.
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Reagan-era tax cuts sharply reduced the progressivity of the income
tax.73 And, for a few years, the tax became almost flat: in 1988, a 15%
bracket at relatively low incomes and a 28% bracket at middle income
levels took effect.74 In 1990, President George H.W. Bush famously broke
his anti-tax pledge75 by approving a 31% bracket beginning at $82,150 the
next year.76
President Clinton signed into law two new brackets applying rates of
36% and 39.6%.77 Temporary tax cuts under President George W. Bush
eliminated the top bracket and reduced the remaining rates.78 The latest
compromise, under President Obama, made the lower brackets permanent
and revived the 39.6% bracket.79
A progressive income tax with a low rate for capital gains has been
described as a “ludicrous business of dipping deeply in large incomes with
a sieve.”80 Most taxpayers have little in the way of investment income and
essentially see their wages taxed at ordinary rates. In 2010, capital gains
and dividends taxed at special rates comprised a mere 1% of the income of
73. Alice Gresham Bullock, The Tax Code, the Tax Gap, and Income Inequality: The
Middle Class Squeeze, 53 HOW. L.J. 249, 256-57 (2010).
74. Id.
75. See Meg Fowler, From Eisenhower to Obama: What the Wealthiest Americans Pay
in Taxes, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.yahoo.com/news/eisenhower-obamawealthiest-americans-pay-taxes-193734550--abc-news.html (noting the “famed promise of
‘no new taxes’”).
76. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Bruce Bartlett, Time for a Tax
Reform, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/02/time-tax-reformopinions-columnists-overdue.html.
77. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
78. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), Pub. L. No.
108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
79. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
80. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 219 (1938); see also Charles J. Cooper et al., The Legal
Authority of the Department of the Treasury to Promulgate a Regulation Providing for
Indexation of Capital Gains, 12 VA. TAX REV. 631 (1993); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the
Consumption of Capital Gains, 28 VA. TAX REV. 477 (2009); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The
Morality Of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J.
119 (1994); John W. Lee, III, The Capital Gains “Sieve” and the “Farce” of Progressivity
1921-1986, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2005).
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taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) below $50,000.81 But uppermiddle class taxpayers (and especially the wealthiest taxpayers) make
substantial investments in property. The top 1% is different from all other
groups in that capital income, such as capital gains, makes up a majority of
their income.82
Investments in property can benefit from many tax preferences. As
explained below, some of the most important are the realization rule, the
step-up in basis for heirs who inherit property, and the preferential tax rates
applicable to net long-term capital gains. The capital gains preference has
been almost a constant in modern tax history.83 Today, the highest rate on
most long-term capital gains is 20%, just under half the highest rate
applicable to ordinary income. The recent tax on net investment income
adds another 3.8%.84
There are legitimate reasons for special treatment of certain capital gains.
Among the hodgepodge of rationales that are often cited for the capital
gains preference, the most compelling is that it helps neutralize the effects
of inflation and bunching of income accrued over many years into one
taxable period.85 The importance of inflation is the understatement of basis
and the taxation of nominal gains. Bunching, on the other hand, could
possibly push a taxpayer into a higher tax bracket for the year of the gain
realization.
Taxing capital gains accurately may also require inflation adjustments to
basis.86 Because the income tax does not index cost basis, the capital gains
preference can be rationalized to a limited extent as roughly making good
on that failure. But the capital gains preference is poorly tailored to
implement that rationale. The preference is triggered after owning an asset
for a year and a day and does not depend on the taxpayer having a
81. See Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2010, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL.,
Fall 2012, at 5, 10 fig.F, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12infallbulincome.pdf.
82. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND
FEDERAL TAXES, 2011, at 5 (2014) (finding that labor income made up at least two-thirds of
market income for each quintile though the share “falls off significantly for households in
the top 1 percent of the distribution”).
83. Before 1921 and from 1988-1991, there was no preference.
84. See Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1402(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1060-62 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 1411).
85. See Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 186 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting
importance of “appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time” and
“‘bunching’ effect”).
86. See generally Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV.
537 (1993).
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significant tax basis.87 Further complicating reform of the taxation of capital
gains is the corporate income tax, the burden of which may be borne by
shareholders or shifted to labor.88
The realization rule has always been a basic principle of the federal
income tax. Although the normative tax base would theoretically include
changes in wealth during the year, tax generally is triggered only upon a
sale or other disposition of property. This deferral allows investors to
radically reduce, or even eliminate, tax on their gains in property. Because
the ownership of property is so concentrated, the benefits of deferral are
quite regressively distributed. By one estimate, $2 or $3 trillion in
unrealized gains are excluded from tax.89
Although U.S. citizens and corporations pay tax on their worldwide
income, there are ample opportunities for the U.S. owners of foreign
corporations to avoid U.S. tax on foreign income.90 In general, the foreign
income of foreign corporations beneficially owned by Americans remains
outside the U.S. tax net, subject to certain anti-deferral regimes.
Consequently, income can generally be deferred until repatriation in the
form of a dividend. The received wisdom is that repatriation will not be
forthcoming, because owners would hope for a tax holiday reducing or
eliminating the tax rate on such income.
Section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a “step-up”91 in
basis for inherited property. In other words, the decedent’s heirs or devisees
take the property with a basis equal to the property’s fair market value. 92
With basis equal to fair market value, if the new owner immediately cashes
out, no gain or loss is recognized. Or, if the heir waits until later to sell,
only the appreciation in the property after the decedent’s death will be
taxed. Thus, neither the decedent nor the heirs pay tax on any appreciation

87. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1222 (2012).
88. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
89. See ARTHUR B. LAFFER & STEPHEN MOORE, RETURN TO PROSPERITY: HOW AMERICA
CAN REGAIN ITS ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER STATUS 183 (2011).
90. See JOINT COMM. TAX’N STAFF, 112TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES
RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN
BUSINESS INCOME 2-7 (2011), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=
3793.
91. Technically, the basis can “step-down” if fair market value is lower.
92. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2012); see also Richard Schmalbeck et al., Advocating a
Carryover Tax Basis Regime, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at
3).
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between the decedent’s basis and fair market value at the time of the
decedent’s death.93
Thus, from a historical perspective, today’s tax rates are not particularly
high, nor do the brackets do much to distinguish the very rich from the rest
of the population. The rich are taxed as if they were upper-middle class, but
because they may realize the bulk of their income as capital gains, they may
effectively be taxed at much lower rates.94 Moreover, such gains may be
deferred or even eliminated if the owner holds the property until death.
2. Other Federal Taxes
The payroll tax was enacted in 1935 to fund Social Security benefits.95
As explained below, despite the appearance of a benefit scheme, it makes
sense to conceive of the program as a tax with two strongly regressive
design features. First, the payroll tax is a flat rate of 7.65% on the employer
and employee with a wage cap currently set at $127,200.96 Second, the
payroll tax base does not include investment income.97 This exclusion
constitutes another regressive feature because those with wealth to invest
have greater ability to pay than those with equal wage income.98
93. There is a misconception that section 1014 is meant to eliminate double taxation.
See, e.g., Janis v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the “rule avoids
a double tax on the appreciation in the value of the property that occurred prior to death”).
Section 1014 can hurt the decedent’s heirs when the estate tax applies, if it results in a “stepdown.” Section 1014 may help the decedent’s heirs even when the estate tax does not apply,
because the “step-up” is not conditioned on estate tax liability.
94. See Joseph D. Henchman & Christopher L. Stephens, Playing Fair: Distribution,
Economic Growth, and Fairness in Federal and State Tax Debates, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
89, 101 (2014) (“Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway . . . famously complained that
it was unfair that he pays a lower percentage of his income in federal taxes than his
secretary.”); McMahon, supra note 20, at 1005 (“[I]ncomes of the members of this club [the
Fortunate 400] consist largely of capital gains—over 70% of the group’s total AGI in each
of 1998, 1999, and 2000 was net capital gains.”).
95. See generally C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM (1994); Wilbur J.
Cohen, The Development of the Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years
Later, 68 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1983).
96. See Contribution and Benefit Base, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/
oact/cola/cbb.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
97. A 3.8% surcharge on net investment income for taxpayers with income over
$200,000 was enacted in 2010 to help fund Medicare. See Healthcare and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1402(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1060-62
(2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 1411).
98. See Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
113, 130 n.98 (2014) (“Of course, the low-income investor has wealth, which the low-
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Like the income tax, “[t]he payroll tax affects too many people and raises
too much revenue to remain outside the core debate about tax fairness.”99
The fairness debate concerns both the need for fair distinctions between the
rich and others as well as unfair distinctions between laborers and investors
with the same income. Because of the regressive nature of the payroll tax,
“[i]f the tax system’s treatment of retirement savings is analyzed along with
the Social Security system, the combined system reveals ‘a far less
redistributive, and thus less justice-enhancing, national retirement security
program than emerges from looking at Social Security benefits alone.’”100
Without embracing a benefits model of taxation, Professor Sugin argues
that Social Security differs importantly from a market:
If payroll taxes “buy” retirement security, the price is arbitrary,
depending on numerous factors including lifespan, income, and
marital status. Early participants in the program received
significantly more in retirement benefits than they had paid in
taxes. In contrast, Social Security is a bad “investment” for
numerous workers today because many individuals retiring now
paid more in Social Security taxes than they will receive in
retirement benefits. . . . Some groups, like non-working spouses
of high-income taxpayers who receive widow benefits have
disproportionally benefitted under the scheme. Others, black
men in particular, do not live long enough to collect a fair share
of benefits compared to taxes paid. . . . [T]he amount of tax that
pays for credits . . . . differs for high and low-income taxpayers,
and has changed over time.101
Accordingly, Social Security more resembles a tax than a fee and should
not be walled off from broader discussions of tax equity.
Anticipating the potential objection that the fee should simply be
recalibrated, Professor Sugin suggests that if the benefits theory of taxation
has a place, it is for concrete, determinable benefits.102 The value of Social
Security benefits, however, is arguably too indeterminate to fit the model.103
income wage earner eligible for the credits does not, so the very low-income investor is
likely to be substantially better off financially than the very low-income worker.”).
99. Id. at 115.
100. Id. at 115 n.9 (quoting Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement
Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 873 (1987)).
101. See id. at 136 (footnotes omitted).
102. See id. at 137.
103. See id. Professor Sugin outlines the reasons behind the indeterminacy as follows:
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The estate tax could theoretically compensate for distributional
shortcomings of the income tax and the payroll tax. Estate tax repeal,
however, has proven surprisingly popular.104 Very few families would
receive the bulk of the benefits of repeal.105 Tales of disaster about the
breakup of family farms and small businesses, though apocryphal,
presumably have led to the unpopularity of the tax.106
From 1935 to 1971, the top estate tax rate stood at 70% or 77%.107 The
top bracket threshold was millions higher than the $1 million top bracket
today, even without adjustment for inflation.108 As late as the 1990s, less
In the case of Social Security retirement, the “price” for benefits must be paid
many years prior to the receipt of benefits. Is the benefit the actual amount of
Social Security received over a lifetime, or is the benefit the security of a
steady income until death, regardless of the actual amount paid out? These
valuation problems arise in determining the right levy for payroll taxes under a
benefits tax scheme, and using the tax’s flat rate as a percentage of wages up to
a cap is problematic at best.
Id.
104. Michael J. Graetz, “Death Tax” Politics, 57 B.C. L. REV. 801, 813 (2016) (“The
temporary estate tax repeal in 2010 and that year’s political deal ratify the much broader
success of a conservative Republican wing that has been attacking progressive taxation and
pushing its anti-tax agenda over the past three decades. Neither the fight over the estate tax,
nor the larger debate about progressive taxation, is anywhere close to being over.”); see also
Weakliem & Biggert, supra note 37, at 69 (“[A] 2008 CBS News/New York Times survey
noted that the estate tax applied only to estates of over 3.5 million dollars and followed by
asking respondents which statement came closer to their own view: ‘there should be no tax
on any estate’ or ‘the estate tax should be eliminated for most people, but kept in place for
the very largest estates.’ Opinions were evenly divided, with 44% in favor of complete
elimination and 47% in favor of keeping it for the largest estates; only 4% volunteered that
the tax should be kept as it is or applied more widely.”).
105. See Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, IRS
STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer 2007, at 118, 124-25, 128, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/ninetyestate.pdf (providing brief history of estate tax and graphing the “small fraction of
estates” that have paid the tax).
106. See Glenn Kessler, Is the Estate Tax Killing Small Farms and Businesses?, WASH.
POST (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/14/
the-facts-about-the-estate-tax-and-farmers; Misperceptions on Estate Tax Detracting from
Worthwhile Revenues for United States, RUTGERS BUS. SCH. (May 25, 2011), http://www.bus
iness.rutgers.edu/business-insights/misperceptions-estate-tax-detracting-worthwhile-revenuesunited-states (“People often complain that family businesses or family farms have to be sold to
meet the estate tax, but in 2001 when Congress held hearings on repealing the tax, they were
hard pressed to find any farms or businesses that were forced to liquidate because of it.”)
(quoting Professor Jay Soled).
107. See Jacobson et al., supra note 105, at 122.
108. See id. at 122, 124.
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staggering estates were subject to the estate tax, and the rate maxed out at
55%. The exemption amount stood at $675,000 before the Bush tax cuts.109
Currently only multimillion-dollar estates are subject to the tax and at a rate
of 40%.110 With an exemption amount of over $5 million (over $10 million
for a married couple), very few estates are subject to the tax. Whether the
estate tax results in substantial revenue collection from those to whom it
would seem likely to apply is another question. It is no secret that the rich
often engage in aggressive estate tax planning.111 Some argue that the rules
effectively require taxpayers to bear a significant amount of economic risk
to achieve aggressive estate tax planning goals.112
In sum, although the models and estimates vary, the federal tax system is
much less progressive than most would imagine.113 Although this Article
does not attempt to specify the ideal level of progressivity in the system, it
proceeds on the assumption that substantially more progressivity is
desirable.
II. Challenges of Linking Wealth Inequality
with “Ability to Pay” Income Tax
A host of substantial challenges, ranging from theoretical to practical,
stand between wealth and the income tax. This Part first seeks to identify
the tax justice theories that would bring legitimacy to progressive income
taxation, wealth taxation, and by extension addressing wealth in the income
tax. This preliminary step seems in order given the conceptual disconnect
between wealth and income and the growing scholarly movement to
address tax equity.114 After grappling with these theoretical problems, the

109. See id. at 122.
110. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (2012).
111. See Caron & Repetti, Estate Tax Non-Gap, supra note 18, at 154; see also supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
112. See Caron & Repetti, Estate Tax Non-Gap, supra note 18, at 162.
113. See JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32693, DISTRIBUTION OF
THE TAX BURDEN ACROSS INDIVIDUALS: AN OVERVIEW (2010); Average Effective Federal Tax
Rates – All Tax Units, by Expanded Cash Income Level, 2016, TAX POL’Y CTR.(Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/baseline-average-effective-tax-rates-march2017/t17-0039-average-effective-federal.
114. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax
Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008) (“Tax policy has ignored the necessity of first
identifying equity goals appropriate for a just government and then designing a tax system to
help achieve those goals.”); Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax
Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 231 (2011) (arguing for “a nuanced, philosophical
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discussion anticipates concerns relating to public support for the policy
change, potential economic distortions that might follow, and
administrative difficulties.
A. The Protean Nature of “Ability to Pay”
As indicated in the introduction,115 this Article has highlighted ability to
pay because of its longstanding importance as a tax policy norm. 116 Even
those who discount it feel compelled to engage with it.117 Ability to pay
falls under a broader principle of fair sacrifice. The benefit principle could
be characterized as perhaps the chief rival theory of tax justice at this
time.118 There are, to be sure, other theories of tax justice, such as
libertarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and social welfarism.119
This Article will not dwell long on the benefits principle, however, given
that the weight of scholarship has moved on in favor other theories. As
Professor Deborah Schenk writes, “[t]he benefits principle posits that
government expenses should be allocated in proportion to the benefits

understanding of fairness that incorporates the role of taxation into a broader conception of a
just society”).
115. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
116. See Sugin, supra note 114, at 248 (“Proponents of equality in taxation must consider
how best to incorporate the complexities of measuring valuation and productivity into the
standard analyses of ability to pay and equal sacrifice.”). This shorthand is also standard fare
in textbooks. See, e.g., JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFERY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL TAXATION 3 (3d ed. 2013) (“[A] system should levy taxes commensurately with
one’s ability to pay those taxes. It is generally thought that incomes taxes and consumption
taxes are best on this count.”).
117. See Buehler, supra note 15, at 244 (recounting Buehler’s participation in a National
Tax Association “round table of economists, tax administrators, and others,” some of whom
“denounced” the phrase, and that “after heated controversy it was apparent that ability to pay
still possessed much vigor, that it had many ardent supporters, and that it was not yet ready
for burial”); Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 310-11
(2000); Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423,
459 n.173 (2000).
118. See Rakowski, supra note 117, at 310 (“The chief rival (or back-up) to the benefit
principle as a standard for apportioning the cost of public goods has been the fair sacrifice
principle.”); Repetti, supra note 114, at 1133-34 (describing benefits principles and ability to
pay); Schenk, supra note 117, at 458 (“Rejection of the benefits principle as a means of
allocating the cost of public goods usually leads to consideration of fair sacrifice
principles.”).
119. See Barbara H. Fried, Compared to What? Taxing Brute Luck and Other SecondBest Problems, 53 TAX L. REV. 377, 379 (2000); Repetti, supra note 114, at 1134; Sugin,
supra note 114, at 239.
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received.”120 Professor Schenk then identifies difficult computational
questions that “make[] it clear that this is not a workable approach.”121 That
being said, the benefits principle is usually taken to counsel in favor of a
head tax rather than a progressive tax system of any kind.122
Even the opponents of wealth taxation concede that the application of
benefits principles is “difficult” and “our intuitions . . . offer only shaky
guidance.”123 Professor Rakowski presents (and rejects) two plausible
benefits rationales for wealth taxation. First, “insofar as the state’s
protective benefits are limited to worldly goods, one might think that it
makes sense for the tax to vary with the value of those goods, just as the
cost of insuring them does.”124 Second, “the rich evidently benefit most
from economic activity in quantitative material terms and that, speaking
very generally, economic flourishing depends on a nation’s security and its
suppression of criminal activity.”125 In sum, reasonable minds could differ
about how to apply benefits principles to wealth taxation, given the
apparent difficulty of apportionment of costs.
It is probably fair to say that ability to pay, along with other fair sacrifice
principles, has dominated other plausible tax justice norms.126 Yet this leads
to difficult questions concerning what these principles mean. Fair sacrifice
principles standing alone do not point to a specific tax base.127 More
generally, “the burden of supplying public goods should be allocated
among citizens based not on what each receives, but rather on what
constitutes a fair contribution.”128
Economist Nicholas Kaldor is often cited for the proposition that “[o]nly
a combination of income and property taxes can give an approximation to
taxation in accordance with ability to pay.”129 Other scholars have
elaborated on the notion that wealth affords benefits in addition to future
consumption:

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Schenk, supra note 117, at 458.
Id.
Rakowski, supra note 117, at 304; Schenk, supra note 117, at 458.
Rakowski, supra note 117, at 303.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 308.
See supra notes 3, 117, and accompanying text.
See Schenk, supra note 117, at 458.
Id.
See Rakowski, supra note 117, at 365 (alteration in original) (quoting NICHOLAS
KALDOR, INDIAN TAX REFORM: REPORT OF A SURVEY (1956), reprinted in NICHOLAS
KALDOR, REPORTS ON TAXATION II, at 31, 58 (1980)).
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[W]ealth confers political power, social power, peace of mind,
independence, security and, at least in early 21st century United
States, great prestige. The power to direct investment of savings
to private, rather than public ends, is a further benefit. For some,
wealth may not even represent future consumption;
accumulation may be an end in itself.130
Professor Repetti echoes these themes, albeit in setting forth a different
theory of tax justice that supports wealth taxation: “Persons with greater
wealth have more to invest and thus can exercise greater control. . . . [T]he
selection of investments can exert great influence.”131
The typical fairness objections to wealth taxation include that it would be
unfair to savers or would unfairly exclude human capital.132 Professor
Schenk persuasively argues that allowing “time preferences” to override the
choice of tax base is putting the “cart before the horse.”133 Professor Schenk
also offers a rejoinder to the human capital objection: that including such
capital would represent “a significant loss of freedom” and that “it is
difficult, if not impossible, to measure human capital accurately.”134 Human
capital exclusion from wealth could also make sense as a rough adjustment
in keeping with the perspective of Professors Lily Kahng and Mary Louise
Fellows. In their view, workers are systematically denied deductions for
expenses that contribute to intellectual capital or the production of income
and should be at least in part recoverable.135
Scholars generally invoke the diminishing marginal utility of money to
justify a progressive tax system.136 In addition, some have argued that
winner-take-all markets buttress this case.137 However, assumptions about

130. Schenk, supra note 117, at 463-65 (footnotes omitted).
131. See Repetti, supra note 114, at 1162.
132. See Rakowski, supra note 117, at 365-66; Schenk, supra note 117, at 465.
133. Schenk, supra note 117, at 461-62.
134. Id. at 466.
135. See generally Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed
Business Owners and Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2013); Lily Kahng,
Who Owns Human Capital?, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 607 (2017).
136. See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax
Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011) (explaining and critiquing this analytical move).
137. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing
the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 79 (1998) (“When income is
distributed in the manner typical of winner-take-all markets, even conservative assumptions
about the rate at which the marginal utility of money declines make it simple to show that a
system of progressive taxation can result in greater aggregate utility, and therefore greater
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declining utility may be overstated or inaccurate.138 It may be more
intellectually honest to stipulate that egalitarian theories of justice or other
rationales for redistribution underlie the choice of a progressive tax
system.139
Thus, ability to pay, at a superficial level, relates to the available
resources of the taxpayer, but, at a deeper level, it is a heuristic for a milieu
of policy considerations behind the implementation of a progressive income
tax.140 Redistributive “theories fall into two groups: those that equalize
opportunity or resources and those that equalize welfare or outcomes.”141
Moreover, any plausible theory of distributive justice must account for the
importance of luck, talent, and beginning inequality.142 And all these
considerations could be addressed by some form of taxing wealth.143
Professor Repetti distinguishes ability to pay and argues that “the
underlying goal of distributive justice in a democracy is to establish
conditions that will provide equal opportunity for all to participate, [so] the
government’s tax system should be designed to impose a burden on the
taxpayer’s ability to exert disproportionate influence on the political
process.”144 Another potential refinement of ability to pay is Professor
Deborah Geier’s concept of “income available for discretionary use.”145

efficiency, than a system of proportional taxation. In other words, the old equity/efficiency
trade-off need not be made. We can have both.”).
138. See Lawsky, supra note 136, at 914.
139. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 519–20 (1952); Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven
at 50: Progressive Taxation, “Globalization,” and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
731, 745–46 (2000) (“The alternate arguments—diminishing marginal utility of money, the
benefit theory and the breakup of large concentrations of wealth—were dubious even in
Blum and Kalven’s day, and intermediate developments have if anything weakened these
further. . . . There is no escaping the redistributive or fairness issue.”).
140. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 30 (4th ed. 2002); LAURIE L. MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 12–13 (2002);
Blum & Kalven, supra note 139, at 519–20.
141. Schenk, supra note 117, at 471.
142. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 140, at 33.
143. See Schenk, supra note 117, at 471-72.
144. Repetti, supra note 114, at 1160.
145. Deborah A. Geier, The Taxation of Income Available for Discretionary Use, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 765, 765 (2006).
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Either of these perspectives, however, would appear to accommodate
wealth taxation quite comfortably.146
B. Public Opinion on Economic Inequality and Taxation
Tax reform need not be chained to popular conceptions of ideal tax
policy, but public opinion is relevant as a source of inspiration and a gauge
of the relative plausibility of policy options and the likely critiques that will
resonate politically. Recent work exploring American opinions on
inequality and taxation find a complicated set of beliefs. These attitudes
would seem to offer both pitfalls and opportunities for progressive tax
reform.
In The Undeserving Rich, Professor Leslie McCall examines public
opinion data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the National
Election Studies, as well as from historical and theoretical sources, to
explain American attitudes about inequality and redistribution.147
Importantly, Americans have consistently shown strong concern about
economic inequality as well as the relationship between inequality and
opportunity.148 Professor McCall notes that prior work has generated overly
simplistic conclusions about Americans’ views of inequality—these could
be labeled tolerance, ambivalence, or ignorance.149
None of these prior perspectives would seem to offer particularly helpful
prescriptions for proponents of progressive income taxation. The
“tolerance” and “ignorance” accounts might foreshadow futility or a
herculean effort to reduce bias. If “ambivalence” is the correct story, it most
likely leaves space for elites to shape the course.150
Professor McCall’s examination, in contrast, finds that Americans have
consistently been concerned about economic inequality and want the
government to do more to solve the problem.151 Although it may be more of
an exception than the rule, the perception of inequitable market rewards for
labor seems to nudge the population toward intolerance of inequality and
146. See id. at 768, 824 (including “large gratuitous receipts” in the tax base and
contemplating a wealth tax); Repetti, supra note 114, at 1162 (suggesting wealth and/or
income as the tax base to burden a person’s ability to exert political influence).
147. LESLIE MCCALL, THE UNDESERVING RICH 13-18 (2013).
148. Id. at 37 (“Americans are skeptical of the availability of true equality of opportunity
and disapprove of existing levels of inequality . . . .”).
149. Id. at 28-50.
150. Id. at 217 (positing that policy ambivalence represents confusion rather than
ignorance or hostility and a “need for public elites to lead the way”).
151. Id. at 189 (“Americans do increasingly object to inequality, and those who do so
also believe government should act to redress it . . . .”).
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indirectly toward a desire for redistributive policies. Regardless of that
tendency, a clear majority of the population has long answered that those
with high incomes should pay a larger or much larger share of their
incomes in taxes.152 This pairs oddly with results since 1992, indicating less
than a majority answered that taxes for those with high incomes are too low
or much too low.153
According to Professor McCall’s account, prior research had also failed
to connect beliefs about inequality to beliefs about opportunity. Professor
McCall’s nuanced findings portray an America that is concerned about
inequality and how it connects with equality of opportunity. Although
Americans consistently show that they believe strongly in “bootstraps”
opportunity, this does not seem to correlate with their attitude toward
economic inequality. Unlike in Europe, luck does not seem to enter much
into the equation in American attitudes toward economic inequality.154 The
American view of equality of opportunity, however, appears somewhat
paradoxically linked with whether equitable outcomes flow from those
opportunities.155
Even if Americans are concerned about inequality, and even if they
believe that it harms equal opportunity, this might not lead to support for
strongly redistributive tax policy.156 These beliefs could be compatible with
regulation of compensation or other nontax solutions.157 Dramatic changes
to top tax rates would appear at odds with prevailing attitudes.
Combining Professor McCall’s insights with a more anecdotal approach
yields relatively greater hope for progressive tax reform that can be
packaged as closing loopholes or forcing the rich to pay their fair share
152. Id. at 198.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 30 (“Americans have been indoctrinated by economic and political elites to
believe that effort is fairly rewarded and government redistribution is unnecessary.
Europeans have been swayed by powerful socialist and labor movements to believe that luck
determines the class into which one is born and likely to stay, necessitating a compensatory
system of social support.”). But see Weakliem & Biggert, supra note 37, at 85 (“The most
recent question, from a 2008 Pew survey, finds that more people ascribe wealth to social
background than to ‘hard work, ambition, or education.’”).
155. MCCALL, supra note 147, at 37 (“Americans are skeptical of the availability of true
equality of opportunity and disapprove of existing levels of inequality, yet support for the
free market in principle is strong. The rich deserve to be well compensated for their hard
work and contributions to society, yet many of them are overpaid.”).
156. Id. at 189.
157. Id. (“The evidence suggests that Americans may be unsure or uninformed about
how to address rising inequality and thus are swayed by contemporaneous debates and
portrayals of the issue in the media.”).
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relative to a current baseline. As Vanessa Williamson chronicles in Read
My Lips, survey respondents consistently believe that the rich do not pay
their fair share and inappropriately take advantage of loopholes.158 The
respondents tend to equate loopholes with deductions.159 There seems to be
no necessary contradiction between these anecdotes and the GSS
respondents—the GSS question could be perceived as more of a question
about the law whereas a free response opportunity allows respondents to
explore the compliance reality. Perhaps the underlying rationale behind the
GSS data mined by Professor McCall is that if the rich paid taxes at an
effective rate close to that in the tax tables, then their tax burden would not
be too low.
This important work on American opinions toward tax and inequality
does not suggest that the most aggressive and salient income tax measures
to combat inequality—such as radically increased tax rates for the rich—are
nonstarters. Yet they do suggest support for measures that would bring the
effective tax rate for rich individuals closer to the rates suggested by the tax
tables. That may not mean just closing “loopholes. The public may much
more readily support mark-to-market or ending step-up at death than more
progressive tax brackets.
This is not to say that even closing loopholes—or securing similar tax
law changes—would be easy politically. It also does not mean that changes
to the top tax bracket are out of the question. It may become even more
feasible if American attitudes about the role of luck toward economic
inequality were to become more like those in Europe. Given the difficulty
of securing tax reform of any kind, to say nothing of progressive tax
changes, it seems beneficial to explore changes that do not involve the top
tax bracket. Moreover, some of these changes could dramatically increase
the tax paid by the wealthy.
It is, to be sure, a jump from “closing loopholes” to the pursuit of assetbased phase-outs set forth in Section III.C. Survey respondents would not
158. VANESSA S. WILLIAMSON, READ MY LIPS 130-31 (2017) (“In 2011, when the Pew
Research Center asked Americans what bothered them most about taxes, 57 percent said ‘the
feeling that some wealthy people get away not paying their fair share’ . . . . This belief, my
interviews reveal, is reinforced by an income-tax filing process that encourages people to
imagine that the wealthy are getting a special deal, and in particular, to see loopholes (rather
than historically low top marginal rates) as the reason why rich people can avoid paying
much in taxes.”); see also Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., (Jul. 2011),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8209-f.pdf (showing that a
majority of those polled believed that “[c]losing tax loopholes for wealthy Americans”
would reduce the federal budget deficit).
159. WILLIAMSON, supra note 158, at 132-33.
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necessarily support or understand this concept. To my knowledge, there
have been no studies on American opinions towards tax phase-outs. Clear
public opposition towards means-testing of Social Security and Medicare
are distinguishable because of the prevailing benefit program logic with
respect to those programs.160
In sum, means-testing or phase-outs, as a framing device, could be
helpful in presenting progressive tax policies. Means-testing has become a
familiar conservative refrain with respect to even the most popular
government entitlements, Social Security and Medicare. Means-testing may
be the frame that goes precisely between the extreme of doing nothing—
i.e., relying on the market to fix salaries—and measures that single out the
rich for perceived “penalties” such as platinum tax brackets.
C. Phase-Outs and Cliffs Create Tax Rate Bubbles
The scholarly reception to phase-outs ranges from firm opposition at
worst161 to cautious intrigue at best.162 Proponents of phase-outs point to the

160. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Look to Wealthy to Help Save Social Security,
GALLUP (Jul. 29, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141611/americans-look-wealthy-helpsave-social-security.aspx; see also Rick Blizzard, Who Supports Medicare Means Testing?,
GALLUP (Nov. 18, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/9733/who-supports-medicare-meanstesting.aspx (“But despite the divisive nature of public opinion on Medicare means testing, it
is easy to understand why legislators continue to revisit it. What will be the cost of providing
the same Medicare access for all seniors? The aging baby boomer generation will soon be
eligible for Medicare, and as life expectancy increases, this group will be collecting
Medicare longer. This bubble will dramatically increase the overall cost of Medicare.”).
161. See generally Glenn E. Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver: “Phasing-Out” Tax
Allowances Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505 (1987); Edward
J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1898-1901 (1994); Daniel
Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1997).
162. See Samuel D. Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Income Tax Gap, 65 ALA.
L. REV. 139, 161 (2013) (“[T]o promote vertical equity and to prevent the government from
losing too much revenue, the [proposed] exclusion should phase out as a shareholder’s
income increases.”); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22
VA. TAX REV. 645, 731-32 (2003) (“Ultimately, however, phaseouts can be an effective
means to enhance vertical equity at a relatively low revenue cost.”); David M. Schizer,
Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 334 (2015) (stating that phase-outs “permit
precise income-based allocations. . . . focus[ing] the subsidy where it does the most good”
with the “main disadvantage [being] that phase-outs and cliffs increase effective marginal
rates”).
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ability to target benefits to those who need them, a distributive advantage in
improving vertical equity.163
The principal trade-off of a phase-out is an effective marginal rate
“bubble.” This means that the marginal tax cost of additional income
temporarily rises above the rate specified in the tax brackets due to a tax
benefit being clawed back, before falling back in line with the brackets
once the phase-out is complete.164 Phase-outs of tax benefits are often, as
Professor McCaffery puts it, “in fact changes in the rates because there is a
straight-forward relationship between rates and base-definition.”165 Turning
this on its head, Professor McCaffery cautions that phase-outs may be
“rather incoherent if one attempted to defend them as matters of base
definition.”166 All other things being equal, it would seem undesirable for
“marginal rates to bounce up and down for no apparent reason.”167
While policymakers and scholars typically cite cost savings,168 others
have been sharply critical of the cost savings logic. As Professor Shaviro
has argued, “Eliminating the phaseout on a revenue-neutral basis would
simply mean that some taxpayers’ marginal tax rates would drop while
others’ would increase, permitting implementation of a rate structure that
might make more sense overall.”169 And as Professor McCaffery states:
In the case of the phase-outs and the like, Congress is legislating
that people at certain income ranges should pay a higher
percentage of their incomes in taxes, without regard to the
sources of that income. That is, there is no principled decision
that certain kinds of “income,” or uses thereof, should be favored
or not, only that certain levels of income should bear higher
burdens—this is essentially a decision about tax rates. This point

163. See Brunson, supra note 162, at 180-81 (proposing phase-out of a proposed tax rule
in the interest of vertical equity and limiting revenue loss); Donaldson, supra note 162, at
724, 731-32; Schizer, supra note 162, at 334 (“Phase-outs and cliffs offer a familiar trade-off
between programmatic benefits and distribution, on one hand, and excess burden, on the
other. These limits permit precise income-based allocations. This can focus the subsidy
where it does the most good, especially when subsidies generate private benefits.”).
164. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 161, at 409 (criticizing this effect).
165. McCaffery, supra note 161, at 1900.
166. Id. at 1900-01 (citing the dependency deduction and “increased marriage penalties
among the wealthy . . . [that] also have the unfortunate effect of aggravating a bias against
secondary earners”).
167. See Shaviro, supra note 161, at 409.
168. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 162, at 181.
169. Shaviro, supra note 161, at 409.
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is most obviously seen in the case of the surcharge or
“bubble.”170
Moreover, phase-outs increase the complexity of the tax system. By
Professor Donaldson’s count some years ago, the Code contained nearly
twenty phase-out provisions.171 Professor Donaldson, however, argued
against rejecting phase-outs solely because of complexity at the same time
as he criticized the “deceitful” use of phase-outs, particularly in the 1986
tax reform packaged as a tax cut.172 Indeed, phase-outs can seem like
“gimmicks” if their true purpose is simply an across-the-board tax rate
increase.173
On balance, the considerations weighing against phase-outs merit
thoughtful consideration, even for one who cares deeply about the
distributive potential for phase-outs. But phase-outs are not monolithic.
Asset-based phase-outs raise distinct concerns and potential benefits.174
D. Potential Distortions from High Marginal Tax Rates
Some may accept the premise that economic inequality is costly yet
contest that increasing taxes on the wealthy would be a wise solution. An
important theme of the tax literature involves balancing the perceived utility
gains from redistribution with the potential losses from distortions that may
be caused by high marginal tax rates. This “optimal tax” literature is often
cited for the proposition that high marginal rates at high incomes will
reduce total welfare because taxpayers may substitute leisure if work
provides less of a reward. This “substitution effect” is the possibility that
opponents of high marginal tax rates point to, while omitting an offsetting
income effect.
The received wisdom was that an optimal tax would only reach labor and
at a relatively low rate; a fixed cash grant would generate modestly
increasing average tax rates.175 There is another related debate about
whether a (progressive) consumption tax should replace, or at least

170. McCaffery, supra note 161, at 1900.
171. See Donaldson, supra note 162, at 722 n.376.
172. Id. at 731-32.
173. See id. at 725 n.395 (citing Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and
Floors in the Individual Income Tax System, 92 TAX NOTES 1415, 1433-34 (2001); see also
McCaffery, supra note 161, at 1899.
174. See infra Section III.C.
175. McMahon, supra note 20, at 1077-78; Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of
Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 547 (2013).
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supplement, the income tax.176 Scholars have, however, disputed or varied
the assumptions of the optimal tax literature, as well as the implications of
those assumptions.177 For example, the income effect would suggest that
taxpayers will compensate for the tax cost by exerting more effort to
achieve a higher pre-tax income.178
In short, theory does not clearly ordain that higher tax rates would be too
distortionary or that capital should be tax-exempt. Renowned economists
have argued that the realistic implications of the optimal tax literature
include relatively high marginal rates (at least at high incomes) and taxing
capital.179
A related controversy involves the extent to which the income tax can
impose a burden on the return to capital with taxpayers able to make
portfolio adjustments. Some have argued that portfolio adjustments would
allow most of the return to escape from tax, while others have disputed the
underlying assumptions and implications.180 Even assuming that the income
tax does substantially burden the return to capital, an important
consideration is the potential for “lock-in” of investments during periods of
176. See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); George K. Yin,
Accommodating the “Low-Income” in a Cash-Flow or Consumed Income Tax World, 2 FLA.
TAX REV. 445 (1995).
177. See Chris William Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for
Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAX L. REV. 867, 868-70, 869 n.9 (2010) (reviewing
literature critiquing the assumptions of the tax substitution argument before “meet[ing] the
argument on its own turf” and rejecting it).
178. See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 85859 (2001) (noting that “it is difficult to predict a priori” whether the income effect or
substitution effect will predominate).
179. See Daniel Shaviro, The Mapmaker’s Dilemma in Evaluating High-End Inequality,
71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 83, 149-50 (2016) (“It is fair to say that the above quasi-consensus,
even insofar as it ever held true, no longer does. For example, in recent years, three
prominent and indeed ‘A-list’ economists—Nobelist Peter Diamond, possible future
Nobelist Emmanuel Saez, and Thomas Piketty—have written . . . . that marginal tax rates
should be steeply graduated, and indeed should probably exceed 70% at the top of the U.S.
income distribution [and] that capital income and inheritances should be taxed, with optimal
high-end tax rates in a well-designed estate tax possibly exceeding 50%.”).
180. Compare Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of
Tax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 23 (1996) (explaining the theory that the income tax burdens
the risk-free and inframarginal return of a taxpayer’s portfolio “in a manner directly related
to their borrowing rate”), with James R. Repetti, supra note 114, at 1169-75 (probing
assumptions of the theory and concluding that “strong evidence suggests that an annual
income tax that limits the deductibility of investment losses burdens high-income taxpayers
even though they receive the bulk of their income from investments”).
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high capital gains tax rates. Although mark-to-market accounting should
solve that problem, under the current system, the lock-in effect of capital
gains rates (exacerbated by the potential for step-up in basis at death)
presents a substantial roadblock to radically increasing revenue from capital
gains.181
Empirical studies have examined what real-world relationship, if any,
exists among inequality, tax rates, and growth. As Professors Caron and
Repetti report, “all nineteen of the published studies that have examined the
relationship of high concentrations of income to economic growth at the
beginning of a period that extends fifteen years or longer have found that
high income concentration correlates with poor economic growth.”182 This
finding may obfuscate other causal relationships. For example, critics of
high tax rates would assert that high inequality leads to high taxes and that
high taxes in turn lead to low investment.183 Indeed, one study might be
construed to support that claim, to the extent that it concluded that low
capital investment led to low growth.184 Other studies that included tax rates
as part of their model rejected the notion that high tax rates reduced
growth.185
Inherited wealth may be a particularly harmful source of inequality. One
study found that gross domestic product is negatively correlated with
inherited wealth and positively correlated with self-made wealth.186 The
authors posited ways in which entrenched heirs may engage in
anticompetitive behavior.187
Whatever the empirical support refuting the harms of high tax rates, this
issue is bound to remain contested. To the extent that the relationship

181. See David Kamin, How to Tax the Rich, 146 TAX NOTES 119, 123 (2015).
182. Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy The Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to
Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 1268 (2013).
183. See id. at 1264.
184. See Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, Political Conflict, and Economic
Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH
AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23 (Alex Cukierman et al. eds., 1992).
185. See Charles B. Garrison & Feng-Yao Lee, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and
Economic Growth: Further Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 32
ECON. INQUIRY 172, 172 (1992) (sixty-three-country study); Roberto Perotti, Growth,
Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 151
(1996).
186. Randall K. Morck et al., Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic
Growth: The Canadian Disease?, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 319 (Randall
K. Morck ed., 2000).
187. Id. at 362.
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between taxes, inequality, and growth takes a long time to play out, critics
will somewhat reasonably allege that the results could have been impacted
by other factors.188 The notion, however, that the reduction of inequality via
the tax system spurs economic growth finds substantial theoretical and
empirical support.
E. Valuation of Property
Taxpayers would have an incentive to undervalue their assets for wealth
tax purposes and would generally benefit from an informational advantage
compared to the government. The potential for abuse is especially acute if
the assets are not publicly traded. Given the likelihood of a low tax rate and
the likelihood that taxpayers will engage in creative planning or win
valuation disputes,189 one would naturally ask if only publicly traded
property should be included in the tax base.
The limitation of a wealth tax to publicly traded property would, in turn,
generate two additional problems. First, apportionment of debt could be
complicated, particularly if certain assets are excluded.190 Second, taxpayers
might radically alter their investments to shift toward private equity rather
than publicly traded property. Professor Schenk, however, suggests that
private equity is not an adequate substitute,191 indicating that efficiency
losses from portfolio adjustments should be minor.
Asset-testing should not be reflexively rejected because potential
valuation difficulties. A comparative approach would likely find non-U.S.
experience helpful to build on. A significant minority of European nations
levy (or have levied) general wealth taxes.192 In a few Muslim-majority
nations, mandatory zakat functions as a tax rather than a voluntary
contribution.193 At the time of Professor Lehner’s survey, wealth tax rates in
188. Cf. Caron & Repetti, supra note 182, at 1273 (noting that shorter term studies on
inequality and growth may be defective because “the relationship is not a short-term
relationship,” while “long-term studies suggest that other forces may be involved”).
189. Cf. Caron & Repetti, 5 Easy Pieces, supra note 18 (describing success of minority
discounts, Crummey trusts, and Grantor Retained Annuity Trust transactions in reducing
estate tax).
190. Cf. Schenk, supra note 117, at 452-53.
191. See Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based
Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 529-30 (2004).
192. See Moris Lehner, The European Experience with a Wealth Tax: A Comparative
Discussion, 53 TAX L. REV. 615, 619 (2000).
193. See Russell Powell, Zakat: Drawing Insights for Legal Theory and Economic Policy
from Islamic Jurisprudence, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 43, 43-44 (2009) (“Zakat (sometimes
transliterated as zakah in English) is the obligation of almsgiving within Islam. It is the Third
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Europe were quite low and generally close to 1% of net wealth.194
Similarly, although zakat rates vary, a default of 2.5% applies.195 Even
while rejecting wealth taxes on grounds of tax justice, Professor Rakowski
states:
I am less pessimistic, partly because the experience of European
countries with wealth taxes seems to show that they can be
administered tolerably well and partly because it seems doubtful
that low-level wealth taxes would have much effect on people’s
work ethic or frugality or alter significantly the mix of assets
they hold.196
A method of minimizing valuation costs that has been suggested in the
mark-to-market context is to levy a retrospective tax upon the disposition of
an asset, using a deemed rate of return to approximate the taxpayer’s asset
values in prior years.197 It is not apparent that this could be applied to
annual wealth taxation or asset-based phase-outs in an administrable way.
Another approach could be to use cliffs, especially if only extremely high
wealth taxpayers were targeted. There are, to be sure, difficult
administrative issues to be confronted in taxing wealth. But the number of
countries that have maintained a wealth tax suggests that the idea should
not be discarded out of hand.
III. Potential Income Tax Responses
At the outset, it should be noted that the tax policy options described
below are responses rather than perfect solutions to the problems of wealth
and income inequality. Multiple approaches, some non-tax, will likely be
necessary to reduce inequality.198 This Article also acknowledges that
significant design challenges must be addressed in incorporating taxpayer

Pillar of Islam and is a requirement for all believers. In the early development of the Islamic
community, zakat was collected as a tax by the state, and the funds were distributed to
defined needy groups.”) (footnotes omitted).
194. See generally Lehner, supra note 192.
195. See Powell, supra note 193, at 51.
196. Rakowski, supra note 117, at 271-72.
197. See Schenk, supra note 117, at 448.
198. Cf. Repetti, supra note 114, at 1160 (“A tax system, by itself, will never achieve
absolutely equal access to the political process. Doing so would require confiscatory rates
above a certain level of income, which are likely to harm productivity and be politically
unacceptable. But the tax system can augment other approaches to achieving equal access to
the political process, such as campaign finance reform.”).
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wealth into the income tax.199 But there are reasons not to abandon an
income-tax-based solution lightly.
First, the income tax is the most salient and familiar tax for most
Americans and is the predominant federal revenue source. The perceived
fairness of the tax is critical to the success of the voluntary compliance
regime. Even if ability to pay is malleable, its resilience and timelessness as
a tax equity norm counsels sustained consideration of how to implement it
in the income tax. Second, even if other portions of the tax system (for
example, the estate tax) do something about wealth inequality more
directly, different taxes have different strengths and weaknesses. Thus, it is
presumably advantageous for multiple taxes to address the problem of
wealth inequality.200
Broadly framed, three potential income tax responses are considered
below: mark-to-market accounting for assets, bringing back platinum
brackets, and rethinking and expanding phase-outs. Each of these three
options offers its own mix of advantages and disadvantages.
The familiar options are important, but do not address the problem of
wealth inequality so much as the problem of income measurement. Markto-market accounting and the tax brackets do not address the situation
where taxpayers have equal income but different wealth. To address that
potential difference among taxpayers, there would need to be some further
step taken to deny tax benefits to individuals with high wealth relative to
income. Without mark-to-market accounting, it may be helpful to use
penetrative brackets or wealth-based phase-outs as an imperfect substitute
for taxing unrealized gains.
A. Mark-to-Market
Even though the public unduly focuses on the benefits to the wealthy
from deduction loopholes,201 they are correct in spirit. The realization rule
structurally embeds undertaxation of investment income by deferring
taxation until a sale, exchange, or other disposition of property. The
realization rule also works in tandem with the step-up in basis for inherited
property,202 which effectively exempts the decedent’s unrealized
199. See supra Part II.
200. See generally David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income,
Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 357 (2015) (“Because all
plausible forms of tax measurement are imperfect, it often will be better for governments to
utilize multiple forms of tax measurement.”).
201. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
202. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2012).
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appreciation for the heirs. Ironically, these broad rules, which do not
necessarily require any expert gamesmanship, are probably not what
average citizens have in mind when they criticize loopholes for the wealthy.
The realization rule may amount to trillions of dollars in tax base
erosion.203 Accordingly, it is critical to do something about this problem if
the goal is to address differences in wealth within the income tax.204 As
noted above, reforming the realization rule would not really draw
distinctions between taxpayers based on their wealth, but it would correct
the measurement of income. And without correct income measurement, it
would not be clear that truly like taxpayers were being compared if, for
example, an asset-based phase-out were adopted.205
A mark-to-market tax on property would face administrative challenges,
especially with respect to real estate and intangibles. One option would be
to embrace the complications because of the importance of doing something
about unreported income and the lock-in effect. Moreover, valuation
complications can be mitigated by imposing a deferral penalty if the system
only applies to easily valued assets.206 If the penalty were insufficient,
however, the lock-in effect would remain.207
Although realization and the step-up at death create a powerful effect
together, they do not necessarily have to be repealed together. And one
would expect section 1014 to fall more easily than the realization rule.
Carryover basis—the least transformational alternative to section 1014—
would not add much complexity to the tax system. Although section 1014
arguably once had merit for administrative reasons—that it would be
difficult to know the decedent’s basis long after his or her death—modern

203. See generally David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation,
109 TAX NOTES 1047 (2005).
204. Analysis of the constitutional issues for mark-to-market taxation lies beyond the
scope of this Article. It bears mentioning, however, that a more limited mark-to-market
regime for dealers in securities has existed for some time. See I.R.C. § 475. This provision
has been upheld by the lower federal courts though has never been reviewed by the Supreme
Court. See Miller, supra note 203, at 1053.
205. See infra Section III.C.
206. See David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95,
100 (1999) (“[T]o have the same effective tax rates, the mark-to-market base must have a
lower nominal rate than the realization base.”).
207. Cf. Kamin, supra note 181, at 123 n.29 (stating that “[s]uch an approach might help
to minimize . . . although certainly not eliminate” planning around the choice of systems).
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technology has all but eliminated the need for this unfair and distortionary
provision.208
In addition, the abolition of section 1014 should enhance efficiency. One
of the problems with the realization rule is that it arguably causes taxpayers
to retain investments to avoid realizing gain. Neutralizing this lock-in effect
is one of the arguments in favor of a capital gains preference. However, the
section 1014 exclusion is incoherent vis-à-vis the lock-in rationale. If
taxpayers are able to reap the ultimate capital gains preference—complete
exemption of all unrealized appreciation via step-up in basis at death—by
holding assets for as long as they can, then they have the ultimate lock-in
incentive.209
Another alternative to carry-over basis is taxation of unrealized gains at
the decedent’s death. This would completely remove the problem of record
keeping for decades and over several taxpayers’ lifetimes. It would also be
a more effective option to reduce the lock-in effect. Deemed realization at
death would not represent additional complexity for taxpayers who already
must value their assets in anticipation of the estate tax, though it could
conceivably extend that complexity to those who are nowhere near the
threshold for estate tax liability.
In sum, repealing the realization rule—or at least section 1014—is
critically important to measuring income correctly. Even if these
technicalities are nothing like what the public has in mind, this sort of tax
reform should tap into public desire to combat loopholes without
necessarily raising tax rates. These reform options—even the less dramatic
ones—would also appear to offer important efficiency advantages.
The chief drawback is complexity, which falls into two different
versions. First, it may prove easy to overstate the reporting burden for the
average taxpayer and difficult to counteract misinformation. Although a
208. Schmalbeck et al., supra note 92, manuscript at 23-24) (“In sum, in virtually every
sphere, technological advancements are making tax basis identification viable, even after a
taxpayer’s death. With respect to the vast majority of valuable assets that a decedent owns
(e.g., stock and bond investments and business real estate and equipment), tax basis records
are readily accessible. Admittedly, some of the decedent’s assets (e.g., jewelry and title to a
residential home) could prove challenging with respect to making accurate tax basis
identifications. Insofar as these latter assets are concerned, it is important to recognize that,
in many instances, they generally do not comprise the mainstay of a taxpayer’s net worth.”).
209. Admittedly, in terms of lock-in, one could also hope for heirs and their descendants
to hold on to their inheritance and borrow to fund any consumption. But with no complete
exemption at death available, and the risk that the tax system will probably at some point
increase the tax on gains, the benefit of amassing more and more unrealized gains would be
dubious.
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cliff (for example, limiting the new rules to taxpayers with $1 million in
assets) should counteract that sort of objection, it would be an overreaction
and would create strong incentives to plan around the cliff. Second, the
difficulty for the public in understanding these rules probably limits their
effectiveness in fostering the perception of fairness of the tax system.
It bears repeating that, as important as these measures are in identifying
the correct amount of income, they do not do anything to distinguish
between taxpayers with equal incomes and different amounts of wealth. For
that, this Article suggests looking to a new kind of phase-out, as described
in Section III.C.
B. “Platinum” Tax Brackets
Higher top marginal tax rates, as well as more penetrative brackets, are
worth considering as an indirect means of addressing wealth inequality. As
explained in more detail in Section I.B.1, U.S. federal tax history includes
both statutory elements.210 A top bracket of 70% applied throughout the
1970s. In the 1980s, the highest bracket was lowered to 28%, and in the
next three decades seesawed until resting at the top marginal rate of 39.6%
under current law.
In terms of linking wealth inequality to the income tax, the case in favor
of bringing back platinum brackets is less clear than the case for some form
of mark-to-market taxation (whether it be wholesale or simply a revision of
section 1014). First, although platinum brackets would be salient and easy
to understand, and although platinum brackets clearly would not add any
compliance burden for the average taxpayer, the public may not agree that
the addition of such brackets improves the fairness of the tax system. If, as
discussed in Section II.B, the public is focused on closing loopholes, the
reception may be neutral or chilly.
Second, the economic trade-offs are more debatable than those of markto-market taxation. Although the theoretical case is ambiguous between
substitution and income effects, the economics literature provides
substantial support that tax rates for ordinary income could be raised
significantly without producing an overwhelming countervailing
response.211 In contrast, as Professor David Kamin puts it, “when it comes
to capital gains and realizations, the Laffer curve lives, and the current rate
is within striking distance of the top of the curve.”212 Thus, a mark-tomarket system may be a wise prerequisite to seriously considering either
210. See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
211. See supra Section II.D.
212. Kamin, supra note 181, at 120.
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substantially higher capital gains rates or a “Buffett” rule imposing a
substantially higher minimum effective rate.213
Third, platinum brackets do not test for wealth. However, high income
serves as a useful proxy for wealth. And assuming retention of the
realization rule, platinum brackets could be thought of as a surtax for
unrealized appreciation, using high income as a proxy for unrealized
appreciation.
C. Phase-Out Provisions
The income tax already includes phase-outs, usually by reference to the
taxpayer’s AGI or a slightly modified version thereof. For example,
miscellaneous itemized deductions are cut by the 2% of AGI floor.214
Personal exemptions begin to phase out after approximately $300,000 of
income for a married couple.215 Floors on casualty losses and medical
expenses increase with AGI.216
With the caveat that several problems arise upon closer inspection, it
seems intuitively promising to consider phase-outs that would take into
account wealth—and to consider phasing out a wider array of tax benefits.
This possibility has received very little attention in the existing literature. 217
Phase-outs are especially worthy of consideration given the popular
ambivalence toward more straightforward increases to the top tax rates. For
example, the benefit of the income tax brackets below the top 39.6%
bracket could be phased out.218 Without proposing a set of phase-out
provisions, this discussion seeks to identify the most promising spaces for
phase-outs to address wealth inequality.
Phase-outs are worth further exploration for at least two reasons. First, if
the public is resistant to high top tax rates, phase-outs may be easier to
enact. Moreover, even if phase-outs taken together add to the complexity of
the tax system, and even if income-based phase-outs could be translated
into more sensible brackets without bubbles,219 the phase-out frame
213. For an explanation of, as well as a more progressive amendment to, the Buffett rule,
see Thompson, supra note 25.
214. I.R.C. § 62(a) (2012).
215. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707.
216. I.R.C. §§ 165(h)(2), 213(a) (2012).
217. Lee Anne Fennell’s work on the importance of willpower to economic success
recognizes that some tax benefits should be phased out for the wealthy. See Lee Anne
Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1427-29 (2011).
218. Cf. I.R.C. § 11 (2012) (imposing a bubble in the corporate tax to claw back the
benefit of the lower rate brackets).
219. See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text.
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explicitly tailors benefits to need. This is important not just in terms of
feasibility but also as an expressive function that may add to the perceived
fairness of the system. Second, in an income tax that accurately measures
income, an asset-based phase-out may well be the only way to draw
distinctions between equal income taxpayers with different wealth. Clearly,
the tax system is far from that ideal. But many familiar options that are
motivated by the problem of wealth inequality ultimately relate to income
measurement rather than wealth inequality among those with the same
income.
The central critique levied against phase-outs is that there is no necessity
to use phase-outs to control budget impact. Despite the potential allure of
tailoring benefits to recipients with greater need, ultimately one must
engage with whether the marginal tax rate bubbles that phase-outs
effectively create are superior to an alternative schedule without a bubble.
That case is difficult, although clearly it has persuaded some tax scholars to
argue for income-based phase-outs.220
Though asset-based phase-outs would still create bubbles, such phaseouts could not simply be redesigned as income tax bracket adjustments.
This assumes that it would be unconstitutional to deem a small percentage
of the taxpayer’s wealth to be income.221 Even if the overwhelmingly likely
effect of a phase-out is to broaden the tax base, an addition to taxable
income on account of mere ownership of property would likely be held a
“direct tax.”222
To recap and refine the foregoing, there are at least three potentially
promising functions that an asset-based phase-out in the income tax could
further. First, such a provision could serve as a proxy for a wealth tax,
though, because the well of income tax benefits runs to a limited depth, this
proxy tax would necessarily be quite limited compared to a true wealth tax.
Second, it could accomplish a rough tax on unrealized appreciation. Third,
even in a mark-to-market income tax, the provision could seek to achieve
vertical equity, distinguishing between taxpayers with the same income and
different wealth.
Income tests could accomplish the first two functions reasonably well.
The rationale would be that high income serves as a reasonable proxy for
wealth. Asset-testing could aim to achieve better tailoring at the cost of
complexity. There is a relatively limited value, however, in the tax benefits

220. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
221. See infra Section IV.C.
222. See infra notes 273-281 and accompanying text.
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that could sensibly be put on the table for phase-outs, in relation to the
substantial administrative costs of asset-testing. Raising the top tax rates, in
contrast, could raise more revenue with fewer administrative costs. Thus, in
the absence of preexisting mark-to-market rules, it would seem unduly
complex to use asset-tested phase-outs to impose a substitute wealth tax or
a substitute tax on unrealized appreciation. A cliff, rather than a phase-out,
would likely be the only plausible option without mark-to-market.
Importantly, these two potential functions of phase-outs would not
address vertical equity within an ideal income tax. These functions involve
horizontal equity or a surrogate wealth tax. The space to address both
wealth inequality and vertical equity is narrow and primarily lies at
moderate incomes. That is largely because the bite would be nominal for
those with extremely high wealth.
To return to the example from the introduction, one might differentiate
between an investor whose income consists of $50,000 of interest on a
million-dollar bond and a worker with a $50,000 salary. An asset test
might, for example, deny the standard deduction, personal exemption,
lower-rate tax brackets, or personal expense deductions to the investor. At
higher incomes, the standard deduction and personal exemption would be
useless, so the system would have to look to different attributes, such as
itemized deductions or the tax brackets, to make a difference. Assuming
that business deductions and capital gains brackets (unless assets were
already marked to market) are off the table, the maximum possible
distinction that could be made will be limited, particularly in an era with
relatively low marginal tax rates.
As an illustration of what could be accomplished, suppose Tara, an
unmarried taxpayer, has inherited land with a fair market value of $6
million and an AGI of $500,000 from business operations. Assume, for
simplicity, that there is no appreciation from year to year. The six lowerrate tax brackets grant Tara a considerable tax benefit. Channeling Tara’s
AGI through the lower-rate brackets represents a tax benefit worth
approximately $44,000.223
This does not necessarily mean that all of the tax benefit to Tara must be
phased out. Nor does it tell us at what threshold of assets to begin the
phase-out—or whether to use a cliff instead for simplicity. As an example,
suppose the goal is to phase out the lower-rate brackets starting at $2
223. This assumes 2017 tax brackets. See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. The
calculation multiplies the difference between the top tax bracket (39.6%) and each of the six
lower brackets (10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%) by the amount of income that would
otherwise be taxed in such lower bracket.
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million in assets and to complete the phase-out by $5 million of assets. That
leaves a phase-out range of $3 million and an income tax bracket range of
$418,400. Accordingly, one option is to start at the top and lower the
beginning of the 39.6% bracket by approximately 14 cents per dollar of
assets in excess of $2 million. A distinct option, given that tax rates rise
faster at lower incomes, would be to start from the bottom and push income
into higher brackets.
The $2 million figure for Tara’s wealth is useful in another sense. It
represents a net wealth at which losing approximately $40,000 in tax
benefits approximates a relatively high-rate wealth tax. Wealth taxes
normally apply a rate of less than 2%, and $40,000 represents 2% of $2
million. Although the potential sources for phase-outs go beyond the
brackets, and brackets may be amended, this is a useful starting point for
analysis. Meanwhile, if the phase-out is capped at approximately $40,000 in
tax benefits, the impact would necessarily decline in proportion to wealth as
wealth increases. A $40,000 penalty for a taxpayer with wealth of $20
million would amount to a very minor wealth tax of 0.2%. Hence the prior
caveat that the bite would be limited and the distinction would matter most
for the merely wealthy as opposed to the super-rich.
Given this phenomenon, a cliff’s simplicity benefits could be attractive.
A $2 million cliff could mitigate complexity because the valuation question
would be limited to identifying onto which side of the threshold the
taxpayer falls rather than identifying a precise value. But cliffs could lead to
excessive distortions related to planning around the threshold. Professor
Lee Anne Fennell has suggested that modestly randomized cliffs may
minimize those distortions with low administrative costs.224
This framework, to be sure, leaves important questions for further
consideration. Would a cliff be likely to generate considerable distortions?
How many taxpayers would be clustered close to the cliff?225 What assets,
if any, should be excluded for purposes of a cliff or phase-out? Should the
typical framework of marriage bonuses and penalties apply? Should a cliff
or phase-out be adjusted for regional or local differences in cost of living?
Each of these issues should be considered further before implementation of
asset-based phase-outs.

224. See Fennell, supra note 217, at 1428.
225. IRS data suggests that fewer than three million taxpayers have net worth in excess
of $2 million. See All Top Wealthholders by Size of Net Worth: Table 1 – Personal Wealth
2007, IRS STAT. OF INCOME DIV. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-alltop-wealthholders-by-size-of-net-worth (click on “2007” hyperlink).
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IV. Constitutional Limitations
A wealth tax would address the problem of wealth inequality more
immediately and directly than either the income tax or the estate tax.226
Notwithstanding those advantages, wealth taxation—and even potentially
income tax phase-outs involving asset tests—would present the question of
whether the Constitution requires apportionment of the tax.227 As discussed
below, an apportionment requirement would effectively block the tax,
because an apportioned tax would be arbitrary and unfair.228
A. Apportionment Rule for Direct Taxes
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises,”229 provided that “No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken.”230 The Constitution further provides that
“direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according
to their respective Numbers.”231
The meaning of “direct tax” appears to have been unclear from the
beginning.232 As a rough gloss, such a tax is “not contingent on anything
but being or existence.”233 Among the likely original purposes for the
apportionment rule are protecting large states with low population,
protecting states in which slavery was legal, and avoiding crowding out
states from levying poll taxes and land taxes.234
226. See Daniel Altman, To Reduce Inequality, Tax Wealth, Not Income, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/opinion/to-reduce-inequality-taxwealth-not-income.html (“Wealth inequality has worsened for two decades and is now at an
extreme level. Replacing the income, estate and gift taxes with a progressive wealth tax
would do much more to reduce it than any other tax plan being considered in Washington.”).
227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
228. There are examples of early apportioned taxes to fund wars, and the Civil War
income tax was enacted after discussion of a potential property tax. See Brownlee, supra
note 61, at 15.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
232. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 563 (1895) (citing notes of
James Madison), confirmed and expanded, 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Springer v. United States,
102 U.S. 586, 597 (1880) (citing Alexander Hamilton’s briefs); Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796) (Patterson, J., concurring) (“no clear and precise idea”);
JASPER L. CUMMINGS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL TAXATION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 352 (2013).
233. CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 344.
234. Id. at 360-63.
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Apportionment of a wealth tax would be an unworkable “fiasco” in that a
state’s share of the total tax liability would be “arrived at without regard to
the actual wealth held by the taxpayers in each state”:
Take two states close to one another in size. Maryland, in the
2010 census, had 5,773,552 people, or 1.87% of the population,
while Missouri had 5,988,927 people, or 1.93% of the nation. . . .
Maryland in 2010 was a much wealthier state than Missouri.
Incomes were higher in Maryland, with $34,849 per capita, as
against $24,724 in Missouri . . . .
. . . Yet according to the constitutionally required formula,
Missourians collectively will have to pay about the same, or a
little more, in federal wealth tax, than Marylanders.235
Such a system would impose a fundamentally unfair burden on states, and
by extension taxpayers, where there is high population relative to wealth.
The following subsections examine the triggers for the apportionment
requirement.
B. Scope of the Apportionment Rule
As Justice Chase recognized in the seminal case of Hylton v. United
States,236 apportionment and uniformity237 are a dichotomy238—a direct tax
that must be apportioned will apply different rates to the same base:
For example: Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000
dollars each, by a tax on carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage;
and in one State there are 100 carriages, and in the other 1000.
The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax
of owners in the other. A. in one State, would pay for his
235. Matthew J. Franck, The Constitutional Fiasco of a Wealth Tax, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19,
2012) http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/333660/constitutional-fiasco-wealth-taxmatthew-j-franck.
236. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
237. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (requiring duties, imposts, and excises to be
uniform). Cummings suggests that the Court “mostly employed the term indirect as a
simplistic label for imposts, duties, and excises.” CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 340
(positing that the Court assumed such taxes could not be direct because of constitutional
requirement of uniformity).
238. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 173 (observing that Congress “were to observe two rules in
imposing [them], namely, the rule of uniformity, when they laid duties, imposts, or excises;
and the rule of apportionment, according to the census, when they laid any direct tax”); see
also CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 342.
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carriage 8 dollars, but B. in the other state, would pay for his
carriage, 80 dollars.239
Justice Chase observed that the rate differential would lead to “great
inequality and injustice.”240
Justice Chase then extended this observation to a general principle that it
would be “unreasonable” to infer that the Constitution would require
Congress to adopt the apportionment method when its application would be
unjust.241 To avoid arbitrary variation in tax rates, the Court held that the
carriage tax was constitutional without apportionment.242 The same
injustice would seemingly follow, however, if Congress taxed land via the
apportionment method. Yet Justice Chase posited in dictum that the only
taxes contemplated by the “direct tax” language are “a capitation, or poll
tax” and “a tax on LAND.”243 In sum, the Court’s first foray into defining
“direct tax” suggests that the concept should be extremely narrow to limit
unjust outcomes.
Professor Joseph Dodge offers two insights that buttress the Hylton
logic. First, population was viewed as a proxy for land wealth, which would
tend to limit the variation in effective tax rates on an apportioned land
tax.244 Second, if apportionment was included to satisfy Southern interests,
a narrow construction would further that purpose more than a broad
construction:
Apportionment according to population requires that poorer
per-capita (i.e., Southern) states be discriminated against. This
effect would have been compounded by the fact that slaves
counted as three-fifths, resulting in an increase in the quotas of
the slave states without any accompanying increase in any likely
tax base (except a property tax in which slaves were counted). In
sum, the regional-oppression rationale for apportionment

239. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 183.
243. Id. at 175 (capitalization in original). The opinions of Justices Paterson and Iredell
agree on this limited scope. See id. at 177 (Paterson, J.); id. at 183 (Iredell, J.). Justice
Wilson’s crisp opinion concurs that the tax is constitutional without further explanation. Id.
at 183-84 (Wilson, J).
244. See Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of
Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 921, 924 (2009).
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actually favors a narrow concept of “direct tax” that is limited to
taxes on real estate, plus capitation taxes and requisitions.245
Professor Dodge nevertheless concludes that “direct tax” should encompass
ad valorem taxes on any property except intangibles.246
Professor Dodge’s central thesis is that some coherent principle must
account for the accepted and uncontroversial categories of requisitions,
head taxes, and land taxes, all of which require apportionment.247 Professor
Dodge observes that “[a]pportionment among states requires that any item
subject to the tax have a definite geographical location in a state, because
the tax rate for a state is the state’s quota divided by the value (or quantity)
of the subject of the tax within the state.”248
The practical necessity of a physical situs for apportionment persuasively
explains why the original meaning of “direct tax” may have excluded a tax
on intangibles from the apportionment rule. But if one utilizes a formalist
approach (limited to capitations, requisitions, and land taxes), a tax on
tangible personal property should not be construed as a direct tax simply
because it is (functionally) capable of being apportioned.249
After a long period without hearing direct tax cases, the Supreme Court
arguably applied a deferential, formalistic approach in cases after the Civil
War.250 As Jasper Cummings explains:
Up to 1895 the Court identified direct taxes based on the form in
which Congress had chosen to cast the tax: if Congress did not
apportion a tax, and particularly if Congress called it an excise
tax, the Court uniformly ruled it was not a direct tax that had to
be apportioned.251
245. Id. at 893 (footnote omitted).
246. Id. at 843, 922.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 922.
249. Cf. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796); Dodge, supra note
244, at 924 (noting that formalism “has its upside in the present context”).
250. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880) (noting Civil War income
tax not a direct tax); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 446 (1869) (holding that a
tax on insurance company premiums not a direct tax); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 533, 549 (1869). Importantly, cases decided after Pollock seem to follow Hylton’s
rationale. See infra.
251. CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 67. Cummings posits two explanations for the
Supreme Court’s reticence to strike down taxes on substance over form grounds: a kind of
tax exceptionalism in deferring to Congress on tax matters, and that “perhaps the Court
wearied of contending with economic distinctions that were basically irresolvable.” Id. at 70.
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Even after 1895, the Supreme Court only once struck down a tax as a direct
tax and otherwise distinguished taxes burdening capital, generally
concluding that they could qualify as excises. Thus, there appears to be at
least a plausible argument that Congress may enact a wealth tax on personal
property even if a land tax must be apportioned.252
C. Potential Loopholes and Pitfalls
The invalidation of the 1894 federal income tax as an unapportioned
direct tax is hard to square with the narrow scope articulated in Hylton.253
Moreover, income taxes had been enacted and collected during the Civil
War era and were upheld in Springer v. United States.254 The last Civil War
era income tax expired in 1871.255 In 1894, Congress enacted a new income
tax, which was promptly challenged as unconstitutional.256 The Supreme
Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. held that the income tax
was a direct tax that was unconstitutional for want of apportionment.257 The
Court essentially looked through rental income to the source, the land,
“unable to perceive any ground for the alleged distinction.”258
The Sixteenth Amendment neutralized the Pollock Court’s look-through
logic with respect to income and freed Congress to enact an income tax in
Cummings notes, “When Congress episodically chose during the 1800s to collect taxes from
persons based on the value of property they owned, it apportioned the total tax revenue
desired among the states, according to the census.” Id. at 339.
252. Scholarship in this area is diverse. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1999) (apportionment repealed by Thirteenth
Amendment); Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the
Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091–107 (2001) (defending tax shifting
analysis and extending to consumption tax); Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional
Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 297–99 (2004)
(arguing that apportionment applies only if equitable, primarily reducing the scope to
universal capitations and requisitions); Schenk, supra note 117, at 441-42 (suggesting that
recharacterization as an income tax can save a broad-based wealth tax).
253. Cf. CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 344 (“The foregoing generalities forecast the
difficult questions: what about taxes that appeared to be imposed on the ownership of
property other than land, and what about taxes that fell indirectly on land; are excises on the
use of property in a certain way direct or indirect?”).
254. 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
255. Sheldon D. Pollack, The First National Income Tax, 1861-1872, 67 TAX LAW. 311,
330 (2014) (noting debate in favor of an extension but that allowing the tax to expire was
“the path of least resistance”).
256. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 433 (1895), confirmed and
expanded, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
257. Id. at 583.
258. Id. at 580-81.
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1913. The Sixteenth Amendment did not, however, abolish other
constitutional tax requirements.259 Cummings argues that “the abandonment
of lookthrough was limited . . . presumably leaving any other federal tax
that was not an income tax subject to being found to be a tax on property
ownership.”260
The Court had reasoned that direct taxes cannot be shifted, and because a
tax on income from land cannot be shifted, such a tax is direct.261 This test
did not follow from Hylton and failed to account for the high likelihood of
shifting taxes on land to tenants.262 Pollock, upon rehearing, extended the
scope of “direct tax” to a tax on “invested personal property” or the income
from such property.263
Not long after the Court decided Pollock, it undermined the underlying
logic of the opinion. In 1900, the Court rejected the tax shifting rationale in
deciding that an estate tax was not a direct tax.264 In 1904, the Court upheld
a gross receipts tax on sugar refiners.265 And in 1911, the Court
distinguished the corporate income tax as an excise tax,266 arguably using a
“form over substance” approach.267 However, in Eisner v. Macomber,268 the
Court held that “to tax without apportionment a stockholder’s interest in

259. See CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 393 (citing Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240
U.S. 1, 12, 18-19 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) (“dealing solely
with the restriction imposed by the Sixteenth Amendment on . . . putting it in the class of
direct, to which it would not otherwise belong, in order to subject it to the regulation of
apportionment”)).
260. Id.
261. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 558 (“Ordinarily all taxes paid primarily by persons who can
shift the burden upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are
considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property holders in respect of their estates, whether
real or personal, or of the income yielded by such estates, and the payment of which cannot
be avoided, are direct taxes.”).
262. See CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 71. Surprisingly, a consumer sales tax
presumably is not a direct tax, even though its burden could be difficult to shift. Id. Chief
Justice Fuller, author of the majority opinion in Pollock, has been described as “the prime
example of that luckiest of all persons known to the law—the innocent third party without
notice.” Id. at 73 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 175
(1993)).
263. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 628-29.
264. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 88 (1900); see also CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at
379.
265. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904).
266. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
267. See CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 68.
268. 252 U.S. 189, 218 (1920).
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accumulated earnings prior to dividend” declaration was “overruled” by
Pollock.
Most recently, in 2012 the Court, citing Hylton, Pollock, and Macomber,
grappled with the meaning of “direct tax” in upholding the shared
responsibility payment,269 triggered by meeting an income threshold and
failing to obtain health insurance.270 But the significance of a hat tip to
Pollock and Macomber should not be overstated.
To conclude that the shared responsibility payment is “plainly not a tax
on the ownership of land or personal property” is hardly a ratification of the
underlying logic of the expansionist cases.271 Moreover, this conclusion, far
from embracing that logic, seems to undermine it. Arguably, the Court took
care to apply the requirement that was misapplied in Pollock, that the
payment “cannot be avoided.”272
Professor Erik Jensen argues to the contrary: that despite the “sloppy”
opinion, it is “hard to read” the opinion other than to imply that taxes on
income from property are “direct.”273 Professor Jensen concedes that “some
unapportioned federal taxes on property might be shoehorned into the
‘taxes on income’ box.”274 Specifically, the Court in NFIB contemplated the
example of a penalty on houses without energy efficient windows, adjusted
for income, filing status, and reported on a tax return.275 The opinion finds
no fault in this hypothetical, clearly concluding that the penalty constitutes
a “tax,” but failing to specify whether it is a tax on income or otherwise
direct.276
To trigger apportionment for an income tax provision, a court would
have to distinguish the shared responsibility payment, which was held not
to be a direct tax. It would also need to differentiate an income tax penalty
from the income tax penalty for windows clearly contemplated as a valid
tax in NFIB. The underlying rationale is a mystery, but the facts of the case
and the hypothetical suggest that the Court would be reluctant to strike
down income taxes that distinguish between taxpayers because of their
personal characteristics or property. An asset-based phase-out would seem
269. See I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2012).
270. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 570-71 (2012).
271. Id. at 571.
272. See Pollock, 157 U.S. at 558, 628-29; CUMMINGS, supra note 232, at 71.
273. Erik M. Jensen, Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Today?, 108
NW. U. L. REV. 799, 818-19 (2014).
274. Id. at 821.
275. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 569.
276. Id.; Jensen, supra note 273, at 822.
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to be analogous to the drafty windows tax penalty from NFIB. Notably, the
shared responsibility payment and the hypothetical window surtax are
avoidable if the taxpayer has no income.
Professor Schenk’s insight that an ex ante wealth tax can be a proxy for a
low-rate income tax277 is analytically appealing. But this essentially turns
Pollock’s “look-through” on its head, by looking through a mass of wealth
to approximate the income. This logic seems vulnerable. Although
Professor Schenk’s motivation is, in part, to anticipate portfolio adjustments
that would reduce the tax burden,278 a court would probably ask why not
mark-to-market? Perhaps the fatal flaw of distinguishing income from
wealth, in the absence of any discernible cash flows or appreciation, is that
the tax would be automatic and inescapable. Although asset-based phaseouts may be practically inescapable and would increase a taxpayer’s
effective rate of tax, the implicit no-income escape hatch represents a
substantive difference from a direct tax.
In sum, it is unlikely that a federal wealth tax may reach land. Even
Justice Chase’s opinion in Hylton, applying a rule of reason, presupposed
that a land tax would be a direct tax.279 It is perhaps more plausible that the
Court would overrule Pollock and uphold an unapportioned federal wealth
tax on personal property.280 In contrast, an income tax with asset-based
phase-out provisions seems unlikely to trigger apportionment, given the
latest gloss on “direct tax” in NFIB.281
V. Conclusion
This Article has explored how the federal tax system has slumped while
wealth and income inequality have intensified. It has drawn from a number
of perspectives, including theories of tax justice, research on public
opinion, and economic perspectives, to legitimize a wealth-based response
in the income tax. Although a wealth tax could be a more powerful
antidote, the Article seeks a work-around in light of the limitations of the
Constitution’s apportionment rule and avoids relying on the estate tax.
In the wake of the election of 2016, it remains imperative to envision
new responses to inequality through the tax system. This Article has taken
277. See Schenk, supra note 117, at 441 (“To pass constitutional muster, the wealth tax
proposed here easily could be reframed as an income tax with a base equal to the risk-free
return to certain assets.”).
278. Id. at 436-41.
279. See supra notes 236-243 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 261-263 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 269-276 and accompanying text.
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initial steps toward designing wealth-based phase-outs in the income tax.
Although the effect of such phase-out provisions would be modest, assetbased phase-outs in the income tax should be able to pass muster under the
Constitution without apportionment. Moreover, phase-outs would appear to
be more consistent with the limitations of current public opinion than estate
tax reform.
Trump-style populism seems unlikely to result in sharply progressive tax
policy, particularly in terms of the top income tax rate or the estate tax.
Moreover, the House tax reform bill is contrary to then-candidate Trump’s
calls during the campaign of 2016 for curtailing the step-up in basis at death
and deferral of foreign income.282 It is possible, however, that the milliondollar income bracket implementing a tax cut under the House bill283 will
someday be cited and repurposed to implement more progressive tax rates.

282. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The TCJA, however, proposes to terminate
the estate tax after 2024 without ending the step-up in basis. TCJA §§ 1601-1602. It would also
provide an exemption for the foreign-source portion of dividends from foreign corporations to
certain U.S. corporate shareholders. TCJA §§ 4001. As this Article goes to press, President
Trump has expressed support for the TCJA without addressing these provisions that are
seemingly at odds with his prior statements. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the
Press Sec’y, Statement from the President on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/11/02/statement-president-tax-cuts-andjobs-act.
283. TCJA § 1001(a).
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